"Ain't No Snitches Ridin' Wit' Us": How Deception in the Fourth Amendment Triggered the Stop Snitching Movement by Masten, Jamie
"Ain't No Snitches Ridin' Wit' Us": How
Deception in the Fourth Amendment Triggered
the Stop Snitching Movement
JAMIE MASTEN*
INTRODUCTION
They call it "the tipping point."1 It is the idea that small events can have
drastic effects, and that in one moment-the tipping point-a trend can begin
to spread like a viral epidemic.2 What you need to create a tipping point is a
"simple way to package information that, under the right circumstances,
[makes] it irresistible. All you have to do is find it."'3 The Stop Snitching
movement has found its tipping point-and is now infectiously sweeping
through the public.
What began as a few choice lyrics by rappers in the late 1990s, the Stop
Snitching movement has now sparked into a cultural campaign spawning rap
music and clothing apparel 4 thanks to a DVD called "Stop Fucking
Snitching. ' 5 The more daunting aspect of the movement is that it has
gathered a whole generation of teens and young adults who are refusing to
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1 MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 9 (First Back Bay) (2000).
2 Id. at 7. The author uses his tipping point theory to describe how trends, such as the
popularity of footwear and the drop in New York City's crime rate, begin and spread like
epidemics. Id.
3 Id. at 132.
4 Stop Snitching, http://stopsnitching.com/flash/index.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2007) [Hereinafter StopSnitching.com]. At the last time this site was visited, this website
had a direct link from which t-shirts, DVDs, and CDs were sold, as well as a constant
stream of Stop Snitching-focused music playing in the background. The website has since
been discontinued.
5 Jeremy Kahn, The Story of a Snitch, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2007, at 86. Since
2004, a sequel of the DVD was released in 2007 called (appropriately enough), "Stop
Snitching 2." Alex Johnson, 'Start Snitching,' Crime-Hit Communities Urge, MSNBC
Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22734240/. In this sequel there is the same
mix of threats toward snitches and violent retribution: multiple people are filmed talking
about their desire to kill snitches. 1d.
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talk to the police-even when they are innocent witnesses to violent crime.6
They are joining the thousands of other citizens who, led by popular rap
artists, are avoiding law enforcement despite the fact that violent crimes are
continually ripping through their neighborhoods.7 Baltimore's homicide rate
rose so quickly that in 2007, the city was expected to "top 300 murders for
the first time in seven years."8 The murder rate in Philadelphia is alarmingly
high, with the city once coping with a murder a day or more-five occurred
on one particular Sunday alone.9
Whether this movement is characterized as a subset of witness
intimidation or just as a passing fad, the effect of Stop Snitching is real, the
potential hindrance it poses to America's trial system is devastating, and its
momentum is steadily growing. Whereas previous issues of "snitching"
referred mostly to the "jail house rat" or a co-conspirator, 0 the Stop
Snitching movement has spilled over the penitentiary walls and into the
streets of Baltimore," Philadelphia, 12 Dallas, 13 and other major American
cities.14 This code is being adhered to not only by prisoners, but by thirteen-
6 CBS 60 Minutes: Stop Snitching (CBS television broadcast Aug. 12, 2007)
[hereinafter 60 Minutes].
7 Kia Gregory, Call the Police, PHILA. WKLY., July 25, 2007.
8 1d.
9Id.
10 See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and
Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1, 46 (2003) ("[Tlhe prototypical example of the
cooperator with no connection to his target is the jailhouse snitch who testifies about a
cellmate's 'confession."'). See also United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310,
315 (5th Cir. 1987) ("No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than
the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for
which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that
promises him a reduced sentence."). In a vivid portrayal, The New York Times provided
this description of a confidential informant's 'job duties': "They act as eyes and ears.
They serve as secret tipsters. They take the police, by proxy, to the dangerous and
privileged places where badges cannot go." Alan Feuer & Al Baker, Officers'Arrests Put
Spotlight on Police Use of Informants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 27, 2008, at N25. For being
known as a "detective's best friend," it is not hard to see why paid informants are
despised and loathed on the streets. Id.
11 Julie Scharper & Alia Malik, Shooting Victim Was Murder Witness: Rosedale
Man Died Days Before City Trial, BALT. SUN, July 4, 2007, at Al.
12 Rick Hampson, Anti-Snitch Campaign Riles Police, Prosecutors, USA TODAY,
Mar. 29, 2006, at IA.
13 Linda Leavell, Dallas DA Fights 'Anti-Snitching Mentality, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 15, 2007.
14 See Ronald Moten, The Real Meaning of 'Snitching', WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2007,




year-old girls in school, middle-aged neighbors across the street, and
ordinary citizens who would rather run away from the police instead of to
them. Because Stop Snitching is mostly a pop culture movement propagated
by rap lyrics, t-shirts, and word of mouth, the difficulty in how to quell it
remains evident. The options to legally stop a movement based on an
unspoken code are limited. Even worse for legislators, Stop Snitching mostly
advocates non-action, in the form of not talking to the police. Current state
obstruction of justice laws only punish those who actively inhibit witness
testimony.' 5 Supporters of the Stop Snitching movement shield themselves
with the First Amendment 16 and stand seemingly invincible-offering only a
distrustful glare toward police and prosecutors. Yet that invincibility can be
broken, as long as the true causes of the movement are addressed and
countered.
The Stop Snitching movement is a much more perplexing epidemic than
it may seem. Spread mostly through inner cities and African American pop
culture, the movement is intricately tied to race. Nevertheless, the problem of
"Stop Snitching" should not, and cannot, be surmised as just a peculiar
stubbornness and apathy toward the law. The pressures to adhere to a social
code are strong,' 7 and the reasons to follow this particular code of Stop
Snitching stem from a deeply rooted distrust toward the police. For decades,
there has been an obvious and problematic tension between police and
African Americans. 8 Much of the police conduct that is now considered
15 See infra Part II-B for the full survey of state protection laws and for an analysis
of how they fall short of countering the Stop Snitching movement.
16 See Hampson, supra note 12. For a complete discussion of First Amendment
protections of Stop Snitching, see infra Part II-A.
17 See generally Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire
For Interpersonal Attachment as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 497 (1995). For a succinct and illuminating discussion on the social psychology of
human motivations, see TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COuRTs 25-27 (Russell Sage
Foundation 2002) [hereinafter TRUST IN THE LAW]. The authors note the difference
between intrinsic and extrinsic factors of motivation, the former being entirely voluntary
and personally grounded. Id. at 26-27. Such intrinsic motivations to follow the Stop
Snitching code-such as the distrust in police-are what leaders need to address in order
to quell the Stop Snitching epidemic. See infra Part III-A.
18 One prolific example is the phenomenon called "driving while black." David A.
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84
MINN. L. REv. 265, 266 (1999). This occurs when "police [use] traffic offenses as an
excuse to stop and conduct roadside investigations of black drivers and their cars, usually
to look for drugs." Id. In a study completed by psychologist Dr. John Lamberth at Temple
University, experimenters carefully gathered data from over 43,000 cars on the New
Jersey Turnpike-making sure to note each driver's race and whether or not they were
speeding. See John Lamberth, Driving While Black; A Statistician Proves that Prejudice
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standard practice has been determined by Fourth Amendment search and
seizure law, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court.1 9 This
amendment protects against unreasonable searches or seizures; however,
through a line of cases dealing with the search and seizure of people in cars
or in the streets, the Court has created a body of case law that permits the
police (either expressly or implicitly) to use deception. 20 Inadvertently, the
Supreme Court created loopholes within the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, which are often disproportionately used by police against
minorities. This distrust that African Americans quietly carry toward the
police simmered for decades until it reached its tipping point: a simple DVD.
This Note argues that the Stop Snitching movement is the manifestation
of distrust created by continual use of police deception during search and
seizure encounters. Part II.A reviews the beginnings of the Stop Snitching
movement, its sudden burst into mainstream pop culture, and its pervasive
characteristics-including why people feel the need to adhere to a socially
based code. Its corollary parts will discuss the movement's actual and
potential effects, as well as what cities are doing to try to counter the
movement. Part III begins by explaining why the Stop Snitching movement
is heavily protected by the First Amendment and then surveys the current
obstruction of justice laws in effect. Part III concludes by explaining why
these obstruction of justice state statutes are ill-equipped to counter the Stop
Snitching movement. Part IV first delves into why instilling trust in the law
is the necessary starting point for combating this movement. The latter part
then demonstrates how two areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, pre-
textual stops and Fourth Amendment seizures of people, have given the
police the constitutional means to blatantly use deception in their everyday
interactions with the public. It is due to this deception that anger builds
against law enforcement, fueling the Stop Snitching movement. Part V
argues that in order to counteract this distrust, the Supreme Court must
Still Rules the Road, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1998, at Cl. Dr. Lamberth found that
although African Americans made up only 15% of the turnpike's speeders, they actually
made up 35% of the cars that were pulled over-translating into a probability that they
will be 4.85 times as likely to be stopped. Id. Even more astonishingly, African
Americans were 16.5 times as likely to be arrested than their white counterparts. Id. For
an example of how a state court applied this information, see State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350,
352 (N.J. Super. 1996) (statistical evidence, in part presented by Dr. Lamberth, proved
the existence of a de facto policy of disproportionately targeting African American
drivers for investigation and arrest).
19 The complete language of the Amendment states: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 0 See infra Part HI.
[Vol. 70:3
STOP SNITCHING
tighten search and seizure laws such that the condoned deception under
Fourth Amendment law is far less brash.
I. THE CODE ON THE STREET: STOP SNITCHING
From its inception, the Stop Snitching movement has done nothing but
gain momentum-and for good reason. The message easily spreads through
popular music and fashionable t-shirts to people who feel a strong social
need to adhere to this code. The effects of the movement are both palpable
and alarming, forcing district attorneys around the country to brainstorm
some sort of counter-movement with the hope that something can be done to
stop this code of silence from sweeping through the nation's cities.
A. Don 't Break the Code
In late 2004, Rodney Bethea had an idea: he decided to make a low-key
freestyle documentary. 2 But as Bethea began to tape individuals talking to
the camera on the street, something unexpected happened-they all began to
berate informants and graphically describe what should be done to them.22 As
this underground DVD circulated through Baltimore, it stirred up a phrase
that had been around since 1999: Stop Snitching.23
This humble DVD was the pivotal tipping point that started an epidemic.
Contrary to Bethea's intentions, the Stop Snitching message has evolved to
advocate not talking to the police-whether one is caught committing a
crime or whether one is a mere witness to one.24 Followers of the code
employ it in relation to any crime, including extremely violent ones such as
rape and murder.25 The immediate catchiness of the slogan is augmented by a
21 Kahn, supra note 5, at 88. Carmelo Anthony, an NBA star, later explained to the
Baltimore Sun how he incidentally became featured on the DVD: "I was back on my
block, chillin'. I was going back to show love to everybody, thinking it was just going to
be on the little local DVD, that it was just one of my homeboys recording." Id. at 86.
22 Id. at 88. In one scene, a Baltimore rapper, Skinny Suge, told the camera: "To all
you snitches and rats... I hope you catch AIDS in your mouth, and your lips the first
thing to die, [expletive]." Id. at 86 (alteration in original).
23 The phrase "Stop Snitching" is believed to have been started, or at least
popularized, by a rapper called Tangg da Juice from Boston. Id.
24 Id. at 82 (explaining that the "gangland code of silence, or omerta" has spread
from "organized crime to the population at large").
25 When the 60 Minutes broadcast originally aired in April, the rapper, Cam'ron,
stated that he would not call the police if he knew a serial killer was living next to him.
Instead, he said, "I'd probably move." However, after being widely criticized for this,
Cam'ron later apologized for some of his comments. 60 Minutes, supra note 6.
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vast assortment of apparel boldly sporting the slogan.26 A commonly sold
t-shirt is simple in its design, yet starkly unambiguous as to its message: the
t-shirt has a black background with a stop sign, large across the chest,
displaying "Stop Snitching" in bold font.27 Yet supporters are not limited to
just wearing t-shirts. The Stop Snitching logo has graced the front of baseball
hats, appeared in graffiti28 and has even been stenciled onto real street
signs.29
The Stop Snitching message is probably best carried through the medium
of rap music. Dozens of mainstream rappers have contributed to the Stop
Snitching discography.30 The lyrics to this genre of rap, known as gansta, are
explicit and violent toward snitches, and they usually describe what kind of
retribution their writers believe snitches deserve: "Don't let your mouth open
up 'cause you don't wanna see the handgun open up... Ain't no snitches
ridin' wit' us... ,,31 Yet despite the aggressive and brutal lyrics, the music
itself remains somewhat subdued, surprisingly restrained, and undeniably
alluring. These rap stars are gathering young fans precisely because their
music is attractive to listen to. Through the lure of magnetic music, rap artists
are becoming teen idols and models of behavior. Either intentionally or not,
younger generations are taking these Stop Snitching lyrics to heart.32
26 Tanika White, 'Stop Snitchin' Shirts Have People Talking for Different Reasons
in City, BALT. SUN, Apr. 30, 2005.
27 StopSnitching.com, supra note 4. Other popular shirts include an un-smiley face
with the phrase "I'll Never Tell" across the front.
28 Ben Finley, Questions Surround 'Snitch and Die': A Threat or Kids Just Messing
Around?, INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 13, 2007, at B5. The actual written phrase on the
pavement was "Snitch and Die." Id.
29 An individual had even stenciled the word "Snitching" under the word "Stop" on
a stop sign. Id.
30 E.g., OBIE TRICE FEATURING AKON, Snitch, on SECOND ROUND'S ON ME (Shady
Records 2006). Shady Records, the label that produced Obie Trice, was established by
the incredibly popular artist Eminem. Shady Records, www.shadyrecords.com (last
visited Jan. 11, 2008). See also Elizabeth Goodman, Jay-Z Returns to His Roots for
"American Gangster "-Inspired New Album, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 20, 2007 (noting that
Jay-Z's new song, "No Hook," enforces the "Stop Snitching" ideology).
31 LIL WAYNE, Snitch, on THA CARTER (Cash Money Records 2004). The most
explicit parts of Chamillionaire's lyrics have not been included, yet the anti-snitching
message still rings clear: "Russian Roulette, yep [omitted] bet the barrel will spin, you
hear that, yea [omitted] that's the sound of revenge .... Listen to da G-code, if you know
that I know, then you'll keep yo' mouth closed.., we don't tolerate snitches."
CHAMILLIONAIRE, No Snitchin', on THE SOUND OF REVENGE (Umvd Labels 2005). For
mainstream lyrics written by Master P and Snoop Dogg, too explicit to reprint here, see
MASTER P, Snitches, on MP DA LAST DON (Priority Records 1998).
32 60 Minutes, supra note 6. The popular rapper, Cam'ron, is idolized by teenagers
in inner cities-when he started to wear pink, so did his fans. Id. When asked about this,
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This Note contends that the need to adhere to this code is not due to a
personal flaw carried by inner-city citizens; nor can it be reduced to a
characteristic of just the African American community. Moreover, this
Note does not argue that Stop Snitching is a mentality held by all members of
the hip-hop community.34 Quite the contrary, the need to belong has been
characterized as a "fundamental human motivation" applicable across race,
socioeconomic status, and gender.35 This social bond can be formed through
joyous or arduous shared experiences, and it is so strong, that "people resist
losing attachments and breaking social bonds, even if there is no material or
pragmatic reason to maintain the bond and even if maintaining it would be
difficult., 36 Furthermore, people can develop physiological effects, such as
illness and depression, when they are devoid of meaningful social
relationships and acceptance.37
When a code such as the one promoted by the Stop Snitching movement
is so pervasive within a culture, it is extremely difficult to exhibit behavior
contrary to it. Rappers who do not follow the anti-snitching code risk losing
their street credibility and jeopardizing their music sales.38 At the same time,
ordinary people who break the code face social ostracism, retribution, and
(according to the rap lyrics) physical violence. As one teenager explained,
"[I]f [people] know you talk to the police, they don't be around you. And if
people talk on them and they get locked up, their friends come up on you and
one teenager said, "Whatever they dish out, we eat it up. They could dish out the nastiest
thing in the world, but we still will eat it up." Id.
33 Police themselves have a code of silence. Kahn, supra note 5, at 88. This was
pointed out by Bethea (the creator of the Baltimore DVD): "[O]fficers who break [the
code] by reporting police misconduct are stigmatized in much the same way as those who
break the code of silence on the street." Id. A version of the anti-snitch idea has also been
propagated by Hollywood. See, e.g., SCENT OF A WOMAN (Universal Studios 1992). The
protagonist in this movie was set to be expelled for not telling school officials who
vandalized the headmaster's car; yet at the climatic end of the movie, was praised and
exonerated for his self-discipline in not snitching. Id. The individual who did cooperate
(i.e. snitch) received neither recognition nor commendation for his cooperation. Id.
34 City Police Ask Swizz Beatz to Renounce Anti-Snitching Lyrics, USA TODAY, July
25, 2007. Swizz Beatz was praised for his promise not to rap about hard-core violence.
Id. He also stated that he did not support the 'Stop Snitching' campaign and that his
record was altered for radio-edit. Id. Indeed, one factor in people's reluctance to speak
with police is fear of retaliation-which is quite universal beyond just race.
35 Baumeister & Leary, supra note 17, at 521 and accompanying notes.
36 Baumeister & Leary, supra note 17, at 520.
37 Id.
38 60 Minutes, supra note 6. When the famous and multi-platinum-selling artist,
Busta Rhymes, refused to talk to the police about a shooting that he might have
witnessed, many assumed that it was because he didn't want to hurt sales of his CDs. Id.
Being labeled a snitch would have demolished his street credibility. Id.
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hurt you or something. '39 This fear of violence is not unfounded. In a chilling
example, an Arizona woman had the word "snitch" scarred onto her face
with a branding iron after she reported suspected child abuse.4 ° Still others
are enforcing the Stop Snitching message by permanently silencing those
who talk to the police: a sixteen year old teenager was gunned down and shot
three times for giving information to authorities.4
As if the threat of real physical violence was not enough, it is entirely
possible that citizens also feel guilt for betraying their neighbors. Obie
Trice's lyrics from the record, Snitch, touch upon the disloyalty involved in
breaking the code:
Once he got pinched, coincided with law
Same homie say he lay it down for the boy
Brought game squad around ours
How could it be? Been homies since Superman draws
Only phoniness never came to par
He had us, a true neighborhood actor
Had his back with K's
Now we see through him like X-Ray's. 42
These lyrics describe how a childhood friend has collaborated with
police. The social bond that might have been shared in the past is now
considered "phony." The trust is gone, and the relationship is broken, which
can be devastating to an individual whose social ties help him survive amidst
inner city warfare. Thus, the psychological need to adhere to a social code of
conduct remains incredibly strong-as the number of people who adhere to
the Stop Snitching code only grows.
39 Kahn, supra note 5, at 84; see also Erin Grace, To Fight Gunplay, Mum's the Not
the Word, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 2, 2007. Teenagers are not only aware of what
the Stop Snitching code advocates, but they are painfully cognizant of the ramifications
of not following it. One fourteen-year-old girl said, "I'm not snitching on nobody, I swear
to God! I'm not about to say who, I'm not about the say where, either... it ain't my
business." Grace, supra. Another thirteen-year-old explained, "You can get killed out
here if you snitch." Id.
40 Johnson, supra note 5. Even children are not spared from retribution after talking
to the police. During one trial in Rochester, New York a thirteen-year-old witness
showed up to trial with a fat lip and other injuries after being beaten for cooperating with
the police. Id.
41 Id.
42 OBIE TRICE FEATURING AKON, supra note 30.
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B. Stop Snitching Spreads and the Public Listens
In the summer of 2007, news articles across the country abounded with
stories of law enforcement bemoaning the lack of forthcoming witnesses to
various crimes. In Denver, police believe that twenty people witnessed the
fatal shooting of Thomas Powell, yet they were still experiencing difficulty
with having people coming forward to cooperate.43 In Dallas, police are sure
that about thirty to forty individuals witnessed the murder of Brandon
Ratcliff, yet only about a dozen have responded to law enforcement.44 In
Newark, police officers were left with only the account from the lone
shooting survivor of an execution style murder that took the lives of three
college-bound students. 45 Nashville police remain stumped as they fail to
identify any credible witnesses to a murder that happened in broad daylight.46
Even when individuals are the subject of crimes themselves, they are
adhering to the code of silence and refusing to tell police who the perpetrator
was.47 When police asked a teenager who shot him, he responded, "I'm not
snitchin'.,48
These news stories demonstrate how widespread the Stop Snitching
movement has become. But more importantly, they indicate that the
epidemic is having real and palpable effects. This is not just some imagined
fad or a quirky subset of hip-hop culture. The Stop Snitching movement has
permeated the streets of major cities and is actually hindering the success
rates of prosecutors. 49 District Attorney Kamala D. Harris of San Francisco,
California stated: "Without witnesses coming forward to provide information
leading to the arrest and prosecution of violent criminals, law enforcement
cannot apprehend and prosecute those accused of serious and violent
43 Tina Griego, Parents Grieve, Make Room for Ashes of Their Dead Sons, ROCKY
MOuNTAiN NEWS, Aug. 16, 2007, at 46.
44Few Who Saw Fatal Shooting Coming Forward, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
16, 2007.
45 Editorial, 'Stop Snitchin':' When does it End?, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Aug. 12,
2007, at A12.
46 Johnson, supra note 5.
47 Grace, supra note 39.
48 Id.
49 Witness Security and Protection Act, COPS Improvement Act, and the "John R.
Justice Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive Act of 2007": Hearing on H.R. 933, H.R.
1700, and H.R. 916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judicary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement
of the Honorable Kamala D. Harris, District Attorney of the City and County of San
Francisco, California and Member of the Board of Directors, National District Attorneys
Association) [hereinafter Harris Testimony].
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crimes. 5 ° When our adversarial judicial system is largely based on testifying
witnesses, the prosecutorial process is drastically undermined by the lack of
people willing to come forward with crucial information." In an urgent plea
to the community, the chief prosecutor of Dallas's gang unit asserted, "[w]e
cannot lower the crime rate without the assistance of the community .... We
cannot prosecute without witnesses. 5 2 A prosecutor from Philadelphia
whose case was dismissed due to a witness who refused to snitch said, "[i]n
almost every one of my homicides, this happens: 'I don't know nothin' about
nothin'.' There is this attitude, 'Don't be a snitch.' And it's condoned by the
community. ' 53 The reports from Baltimore show that 90% of homicide
prosecutions involve some form of witness intimidation. 4 With prosecutors
from San Francisco to Baltimore worried about their ability to convict, it is
clear that a counter-movement to Stop Snitching is needed to preserve the
effectiveness of the United States trial system.
C. Keep Talking: Trying to Counter the Stop Snitching Movement
Ironically, Baltimore officials were somewhat proud of the 2004 DVD
since they thought it created a perfect opportunity to "raise awareness about
witness intimidation." 55 Maryland State Attorney Patricia Jessamy used the
momentum from the DVD to pass tougher witness intimidation laws, which
made the offense a felony, subject to up to twenty years imprisonment.56
Baltimore even released its own video called, "Keep Talking," advocating
50 Id. D.A. Harris also commented that prosecutors from across the nation generally
believe that witness intimidation stands as the biggest hurdle against successful gang
prosecutions. Id.
51 Id. See also Kahn, supra note 5, at 90 (reporting that after a key prosecution
witness was ejected from the courtroom for allegedly intimidating others, the prosecution
had to drop the trial charges); Ann Ditkoff, Bloodletting: Can Anything be Done to Bring
Baltimore's Homicide Rate Down?, BALT. CITY PAPER, Jan. 23, 2008 (noting the
difficulties posed on the trial system if there is a lack of witnesses).
52 Few Who Saw Fatal Shooting Coming Forward, supra note 44.
53 Hampson, supra note 12.
54 Harris Testimony, supra note 49.
55 Kahn, supra note 5, at 87. The State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Patricia
Jessamy, reported that she tried to use the public outrage over the DVD as the "impetus
to confront the problem at the time." Brendan Kearney, Death Spurs Renewed Call for
Help for Witness Protection Bill for US., DAILY REC. (Balitmore), July 17, 2007.
Jessamy stated, "We used it to our advantage ... [i]t's like if someone hands you lemons,
make lemonade." Id.
56 MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW. § 9-302(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); Fox Butterfield,
Guns and Jeers Used by Gangs to Buy Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at A1.
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cooperation with the police.57 Yet despite their efforts, Baltimore's
homicides are still rising at record rates.58
Efforts have been made to pull the shirts from store shelves-but with
mixed results. Retailers in Baltimore are resisting requests for them to stop
selling the t-shirts, claiming that they are just fashion.59 The shirts prove to
be extremely popular fashion: stores throughout the region are nearly sold
out of their entire stock.60 The money-making ability of the message (and the
t-shirt) makes it unlikely that store-owners will voluntarily stop carrying
them.6' In defense of the merchandise, the retailers point the finger back at
the public: "[Our store] simply provides our customers with the fashion they
request... [our store] does not encourage or support any behavior associated
with any of these images.'62 Of the three cities that have tried to ban the sale
57 Kahn, supra note 5, at 87.
58 Gregory, supra note 7. In 2007, Baltimore's homicide rate was forty-four per
100,000 residents, which is more than three times the national rate of around fourteen per
100,000 residents. Ditkoff, supra note 51. While the national homicide rate is decreasing,
Baltimore's is still on the rise. Id.
59 White, supra note 26.
60 Id. In Omaha, Nebraska, ten-dollar t-shirts that read, "Kill a snitch save a life"
have been selling at a local mall. Grace, supra note 39. The principal of a nearby high
school implemented her own counter-movement against the message, forcing students
who came to school wearing the t-shirts to put on a 'loaner' one from a supply of shirts
kept in her office. Id.
61 A particular Stop Snitching t-shirt design was recently the subject of a copyright
infringement claim (although it was eventually dismissed). Caldwell v. Rudnick, No. 05
Civ. 7382, 2006 WL 2109454, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006). The opinion in Caldwell
also described some of the other designs: "[One] graphic features a circular 'DO NOT
ENTER' sign except that the word 'SNITCH' replaces the word 'ENTER.' [Another]
design features a rectangular 'NO PARKING ANYTIME' sign with the word
'SNITCHING' replacing the word 'PARKING."' Id. at *2 n.3. On the back of one of the
parties' t-shirts, the following text was displayed:
The Department of Hood Affairs is an urban shirt company established in 2005
for the purpose of citing and obstructing any potential communication violations in
the inner cities of America. The Department of Hood Affairs was specifically
designed to enforce the following rules of society:
1. DO NOT SNITCH
2. STOP SNITCHING
3. NO SNITCHING ANYTIME
These three violations consist of divulging unnecessary information willingly
and are punishable by fines of up to $250,000 or greater.
Id. at 2 n. 3.
62 White, supra note 26.
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of Stop Snitching apparel-Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington D.C.-
only the last has succeeded.63
Yet there is skepticism that even if the t-shirts are banned and the music
is silenced, it will automatically alleviate the chronic predicament of witness
intimidation. Some are calling for more community-based initiatives64 while
others still are asserting that the only viable solution is a complete cultural
transformation of America's inner cities.65 Multiple cities, like Philadelphia,
are trying to start their own "start snitching" campaigns; however,
Philadelphia also has plans to set up 250 surveillance cameras to catch
crime.66 City officials there claim that "[a] camera is a witness that will not
be intimidated."67 Either way, district attorneys are feeling the pressure to
remedy the growing problem with both short- and long-term solutions. With
these traditional methods of prevention not having the desired result; law
enforcement and prosecutors are keenly aware of the need for a different
solution-and so they are turning to the laws, but with disappointing results.
II. STOP SNITCHING CLASHES WITH THE LAW
Since the First Amendment heavily protects artistic speech and the free
expression of ideas, countering the Stop Snitching movement through this
amendment alone is nearly impossible. State laws that would be used to
prosecute supporters of the movement are also somewhat unhelpful because
it is difficult to criminalize nonaction. Even still, witness protection and
obstruction of justice laws are not the proper solution to the problem, since
neither makes any attempt to improve the mistrust the inner city citizens have
toward law enforcement.
63 Kahn, supra note 5, at 92. However, some courts in Massachusetts have been
successful in prohibiting people who wear the Stop Snitching t-shirts from entering the
courtroom. David Linton, DA Sutter Defends Tough Stance, SUN CHRON. (Boston), Jan.
13, 2008.
64 Gregory, supra note 7. Specifically, the article notes that another option being
considered by city officials to is develop "a community-based solution beyond simply
shaming residents."
65 Kahn, supra note 5, at 92. Some people characterize "new laws" and "more
money" toward witness protection as only "blunt instruments of policy-makers." Id.
Instead of only "chip[ping] away at the edges of the problem," Mr. Kahn contends that a
cultural transformation is necessary to "reduce witnesses' reluctance to participate in the
judicial process [which requires] something beyond the abilities of cops and courts." Id.
66 Johnson, supra note 5.
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A. "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric":68 The Failure of the
First Amendment
When a witness came into court wearing a Stop Snitching t-shirt, the
prosecutor asked the witness to take off his hat and to reverse the shirt.69
However, the witness refused, citing the First Amendment.7° Indeed, this
amendment, which protects the free expression of speech and conduct,
proves to be a powerful shield to the Stop Snitching movement, since the
medium by which the message is spread is mostly through music and
clothing.71 Rap lyrics, like other forms of artistic expression, generally fall
72
within the protection of the First Amendment. In striking down an
ordinance that sanctioned exotic dancing, the Supreme Court in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim reasoned that "[e]ntertainment, as well as
political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical
and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee. 73
The freedom to wear a t-shirt advocating the Stop Snitching movement
would also be shielded, since it would be considered expressive conduct.74
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he First Amendment generally prevents
government from proscribing speech, [ ...] or even expressive conduct, [...]
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed., 75 Thus, Stop Snitching
supporters have two powerful Constitutional protections in their back
pockets: first, that artistic speech is heavily protected; and second, that
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid., 76 In other words,
68 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). (Harlan, J., majority).
6 9 Hampson, supra note 12.
70 Id. The First Amendment states, in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
72 Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,65 (1981).
73 Id. (emphasis added). For further comment on the applicability of the First
Amendment to music, see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). In his majority opinion, Justice Souter noted that since
the Constitution "looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression," then
the First Amendment would generally apply to the banners andsongs during a parade. Id.
He also reasoned that the First Amendment would unquestionably shield music. Id.
74 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
75 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
7 6 Id.
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states cannot simply criminalize Stop Snitching lyrics and apparel because
law enforcement dislikes the message."
To counter the spread of the Stop Snitching movement by directly
regulating the speech or expressive conduct of its proponents is difficult if
not impossible. One theoretical exception to the First Amendment is the
prohibition of "fighting words," which constitutes speech inherently likely to
provoke a violent reaction from the ordinary citizen. n However, it is unlikely
that the intended effect of Stop Snitching meets the threshold requirement
because, inherently, Stop Snitching advocates non-action. It would be
nonsensical to argue that not talking to the police and not coming forth with
information would necessarily invoke violence or provoke a violent
reaction. 79 It is precisely this 'non-action' that makes Stop Snitching so
challenging to counter through traditional legislative means, either through
Constitutional measures, or through state statutes such as obstruction of
justice laws.
B. The Current Law: Obstruction of Justice
There are two areas of law that would be theoretically applicable in
criminalizing the conduct of either those who refuse to talk to the police
during an investigation, or those who actually retaliate against witnesses who
agree to help law enforcement: obstruction of justice and witness protection
laws, respectively. Yet the statutory language within these two areas of law
77 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). In Cohen, the defendant walked into
a courtroom wearing a jacket with the logo, "Fuck the Draft" plainly visible. Id. at 16. In
overturning the defendant's conviction for disturbing the peace, the Court reasoned, first,
that under the First Amendment, the state may not criminalize the unpleasant use of this
swear word. Id. at 26. Most notably, the Court concluded that this particular expression
did not fall into the 'fighting words' exception to the First Amendment: "No individual
actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's
jacket as a direct personal insult." Id. at 20.
78 The original standard for what constituted "fighting words" stated: "[Fighting
words] include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942).
79 Furthermore, by even a cursory view of the Court's interpretation of the
Chaplinsky standard, it is clear that the 'fighting words' exception is an unusable option.
In the near seventy years since Chaplinksy was decided, the Supreme Court has not
affirmed a 'fighting words' conviction. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1002 (3d ed. 2006). The Court has essentially rendered the
'fighting words' exception null, without ever explicitly overruling the Chaplinsky rule.
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still prohibits only overt acts, and the ability for these statutes to criminalize
what Stop Snitching advocates-willful silence-generally does not exist.
The first problem to address due to the Stop Snitching movement is the
lack of witnesses coming forward to help police.80 Most current state laws
that criminalize obstruction of justice have set an actus reus threshold that
mere willful silence cannot meet.81 For example, in Alabama's obstructing
80 The second problem is that the current witness protection laws will punish Stop
Snitching supporters only if these individuals actually threaten or retaliate against those
who are expected to testify at a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-10-123,
13A-6-25 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.540 (2008); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-2802, 2804 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-53-109, 5-53-114 (2005); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 136.1, 138, 139, 140 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-8-704, 18-8-705,
18-8-707 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-151, 53a-151a (West 2007); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3532, 3533 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.22 (West 2009); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-10-93 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 710-1071, 710-1072 (2008); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-2605 (2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/32-4 (West 2007); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 268 § 13b (LexisNexis 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.305
(LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. § 30-24-3 (LexisNexis 2004); 18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 4953 (West 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-19 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 36.06 (Vernon 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-305 (2007). The federal witness
protection law is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2003). It prohibits anyone from killing or
attempting to kill another person for the purpose of preventing that person from giving
testimony at an official proceeding. § 1512(a)(1)(A).
81 The following fifteen statutes require a showing of intimidation, physical force, or
the equivalent thereof: ALA. CODE § 13A-10-2 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.56.510 (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2409 (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.3
(West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519.020 (LexisNexis 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 751 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-306 (LexisNexis 2002); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-9-103 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-303 (2006); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-226 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-01 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2921.32 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-306 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3015 (2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-117.04 (LexisNexis 2001).
The federal statute mirrors the actus reus set forth by these states. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(a)(2) (2006) ("Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force against
any person...").
Most obstruction of justice state statutes are high level misdemeanors. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 13A-10-2 (LexisNexis 2008) (Class A misdemeanor); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-54-102 (2007) (Class A or Class C misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 843.02 (West
2000) (misdemeanor in the first degree); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24 (2007)
(misdemeanor); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.3 (West 2003) (aggravated misdemeanor); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 519.020 (LexisNexis 1999) (Class A misdemeanor); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRim. LAW § 9-306 (LexisNexis 2002) (misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (2007)
(Class 2 misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-01 (2006) (class A misdemeanor);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 540 (2006) (misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.235 (2007)
(Class A misdemeanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5101 (West 2008) (misdemeanor of
the second degree); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-6 (2006) (Class 1 misdemeanor); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-16-602 (1999) (Class A misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460
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government operations statute, individuals are penalized only if they
intentionally obstruct, impair, or hinder a governmental function "by means
of intimidation, physical force or interference or by any other independently
unlawful act. ,82 The correlating statute in Iowa is even stricter, requiring
that a suspect either destroy, alter, conceal, or disguise physical evidence or
induce another witness to leave the state, hide, or fail to answer a subpoena.83
Similarly, Kentucky's statute for obstructing governmental operations states
that, "A person is guilty... when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or
hinders the performance of a governmental function by using or threatening
to use violence, force or physical interference. 84 With a charge of
obstruction of justice triggered only by threats of force or actual violence, it
is difficult to see how these laws can be extended to penalize those who
willfully refuse to speak to police. Although people who follow the Stop
Snitching movement may be intentionally hindering a criminal
investigation-their inaction does not meet the actus reus requirements of
these states' statutes.
By lowering the actus reus requirement, a few states have passed
legislation that could be more viable options in penalizing those who refuse
to tell the police their belief of a suspected crime.85 Some states only penalize
(2007) (Class I misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.76.020 (West 2002) (gross
misdemeanor).
Only a few states elevate their obstruction of justice violations to felonies-and most
do so because the statutory language itself prohibits behavior more akin to witness
intimidation. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.510 (2008) (class B felony); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2409 (West 2008) (either class 3 or class 5 felony); NEV. REV. STAT. §
199.305 (LexisNexis 2006) (category D felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.32 (West
2006) (felony of the fourth degree); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-19 (2006) (Class 4
Felony); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 946.65 (West 2004) (Class I felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
5-305 (2004) (felony). Still others elevate the offense to a felony for repeat offenders.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.478a (West 2004) (misdemeanor for first time
violators only).
82 ALA. CODE § 13A- 10-2 (LexisNexis 2008). For similarly worded statutes, see
ARIz REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2402 (2008) ("A person commits obstructing governmental
operations if, by using or threatening to use violence or physical force... ") and MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-9-103 (West 2008) (requiring "force, deception or intimidation").
83 IOWA CODE § 719.3 (West 2003).
84 KY. REV. STATE. ANN. § 519.020 (LexisNexis 1999).
85 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167b (2007);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1241 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-705 (2004); 720 ILL.
COMp. STAT. 5/31-4(c) (West 2003); IND. CODE § 35-44-3-4 (B); IOWA CODE § 719.3;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:130.1(2)(e) (2002); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 575.190 (West
2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-903 (LexisNexis 2003); W.VA. CODE § 61-5-14
(2005).
However, 'duty to report' statutes usually apply only to medical professionals or
victim counselors. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2008) (all medical practitioners,
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those who actively obstruct a police officer.86 But at least eleven other states
have codified statutes that criminalize the refusal to aid a police officer.87
These laws generally require the public to assist in the officer's lawful duties
when called upon to do so.
At least four states have passed laws that require a witness of a crime to
actually report it-or at least punish those who have knowledge but who
leave the state.88 Colorado has expressly enacted a statute that establishes a
duty to report a crime when citizens have reasonable grounds to believe that
social workers, and clergy have duty to report); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West
2006) (duty to report felony conferred to physician, practitioner, or nurse). The duty to
report also is contingent on the type of crime, with a heavy emphasis on reporting child
abuse. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (West 2007) (mandatory reporting for child abuse,
neglect, etc.); FLA. STAT. § 794.027 (2000) (duty to report a sexual assault); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (LexisNexis 2008) (all individuals have duty to report child abuse
if belief supported by reasonable cause).
86 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 5-117.04 (2003) (willful interference with police); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.50 (West 2006) (obstructing, resisting, or interfering with police); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-32-1 (2006) (obstructing police in execution of his or her office or
duty); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15 (Vernon 2008) ("interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or
otherwise interferes with... a peace officer").
87 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167b (West 2007) (refusal to assist policeman in
execution of such policemen's duties); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1241 (2007) ("person
unreasonably fails or refuses to aid the police officer in effecting an arrest, or in
preventing the commission by another person of any offense"); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-
24 (2007) ("knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in
the lawful discharge of his official duties..."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.2 (West 2003) ("A
person who, unreasonably and without lawful cause, refuses or neglects to render
assistance when so requested... "); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-903 (2003) ("unreasonably
refuses or fails to aid such peace officer"); N.M. STAT. § 30-22-2 (LexisNexis 2004)
("refusing to assist any peace officer in the preservation of the peace when called upon by
such officer... "); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.10 (McKinney 2004) ("unreasonably fails or
refuses to aid such peace or a police officer in effecting an arrest"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 537 (2006) ("willfully neglects or refuses to aid such officer..."); OR. REV. STAT. §
162.245 (2005) (refusing to assist peace officer in effecting an authorized arrest); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.76.030 (2006) ("unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such
peace officer"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-14 (LexisNexis 2002) (neglect to assist police
officer in a criminal case).
88 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-4(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 268, § 40; Mo. REV. STAT. § 575.190. The law from Illinois is more able to deal with
Stop Snitching followers, since it criminalizes individuals who knowingly possess
knowledge material to the subject at issue, but who leave the state or conceal themselves.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-4(c). This Illinois statutory provision states in part: "A person
obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution
or defense of any person, he knowingly commits any of the following acts:... Possessing
knowledge material to the subject at issue, he leaves the State or conceals himself."
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one has been committed. 9 Missouri's statute comes closest to addressing the
inaction problem under the Stop Snitching movement. It states in relevant
part:
A person commits the crime of refusal to identify as a witness if, knowing
he has witnessed any portion of a crime, or of any other incident resulting in
physical injury or substantial property damage, upon demand by a law
enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties, he
refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and present address to
such officer.
90
Massachusetts, as well, has passed a similar law calling for whoever
knows that a person is a victim of a serious crime of violence,
"shall... report said crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as
soon as reasonably practicable."9' According to the plain language, each of
these statutes at least has the capacity in some way to address aspects of the
Stop Snitching movements. Leaving the state while in the possession of
information, failing to report a crime, or witnessing a crime and not coming
forward do hit at the core of the Stop Snitching phenomenon. Although the
plain text of the statutes seem to allow legal sanction toward witnesses who
fail to talk to the police, no published opinions in each of the three states
have used these statutes to penalize non-disclosure.92 It will be up to the
individual state courts to determine whether the laws will be used in that
capacity.
Yet the more fundamental problem with using state laws to counter the
Stop Snitching movement is not necessarily due to ineffective drafting, nor is
it even due to language of the statutes already enacted. Even if these three
laws from Colorado, Missouri, and Massachusetts are effectively used to
prosecute those who refuse to talk to the police, the problem of actually
finding witnesses still remains. If the police are already having difficulty
locating witnesses just to solve crimes, there is no reason to think that it will
be any easier to find witnesses in order to prosecute them. Thus, the ability
for state statutes to remedy the Stop Snitching movement remains
unconvincing. Instead of turning against witnesses, police should be building
trust with them.
8 9 COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-8-115.
90 Mo. REV. STAT. § 575.190 (emphasis added).
91 MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40.
92 No published opinions as of March 7, 2008 have, to this author's knowledge, used
the statutes in this manner.
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III. STOP SNITCHING IS A MANIFESTATION OF DISTRUST BETWEEN THE
PUBLIC AND THE LAW
Much of the desire to follow the Stop Snitching movement is fueled by
the catalyst of distrust.93 This sentiment is targeted mostly against the police;
however, the real causes for the distrust are rooted in the decision-making of
the United States Supreme Court94 -specifically stemming from Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Only by remedying this deception can the
Stop Snitching movement be brought to a halt.
A. It Comes Down to Trust
With lawyers realizing that current laws are not equipped to deal with the
negative ramifications of Stop Snitching, they have begun to push for
tougher legislation in the form of longer penalties for witness intimidation
violations, 95 and federal funding for state-based witness protection
programs.96 Supporters of such legislation, such as District Attorney Harris
from San Francisco, hope that heavier penalties will eventually deter the
violent retaliation that witnesses face.97 These statutes that create a state-
based witness protection program fail to address the Stop Snitching problem
directly.98 Although witness protection programs ostensibly serve a
legitimate purpose, they are mostly reactionary legislation to the type of
93 See Grace, supra note 39. A twenty-three year old man explained what he called a
paradox: "an ever-present police force that harasses residents such as him but doesn't stop
crime." Id. Distrust against the police is rampant and pervasive. Id. Others have stated
that "[a] system of injustices, including racial profiling, sentencing disparities and police
aggressiveness in certain neighborhoods has built up decades of distrust." Editorial,
Snitchers Needed in Tukwila Case, SEATTLE TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2008, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2004353973_snitchedl 7.html.
94 TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 17.
95 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-302(c)(2); see Butterfield, supra note 56.
96 Witness Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 3376, 110th Cong. (2007);
Witness Security and Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 933, 110th Cong. (2007). Specifically,
these proposed statutes would establish a short-term witness protection program within
the already existing United States Marshals Service in order to aid local prosecutors
protect their witnesses who must testify in serious criminal cases.
97 Harris Testimony, supra note 49. D.A. Harris supported her testimony by noting
the degree to which fear furthers the reluctance of potential witnesses: "There is a very
high level of fear of retaliation, fear which may often be driven by recent, high-profile
crimes committed against witnesses who participated in witness relocation and protection
programs." Id. at 5.
98 This is similar to the reason why state statutes against obstruction of justice fail as
well. See infra Part II.B.
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retaliation that Stop Snitching promotes. These statutes fail to prohibit the
Stop Snitching trend not only because the statutory language itself is inept at
criminalizing non-action, but because the current legislatures fail to address
the true problem that spurred the Stop Snitching movement in the first place:
distrust. City leaders need to remedy this distrust, rather than pursue options
that may only increase the resentment. 99
Overextending the laws and punishing those who adhere to the Stop
Snitching movement will only generate more animosity. Baltimore State's
Attorney has even suggested, as a last resort, keeping reluctant witnesses in
jail until trial, even though this could be for an extended period of time.100
Although a deprivation of liberty is somewhat less severe than a full-blown
criminal prosecution, it still would only have the adverse effect of inducing
potential witnesses not to come forward to begin with. It is hard to imagine
why a witness would come forward with information of a crime when there
remains the possibility that they would be put in jail until the trial should
they express reluctance toward testifying. The goal of law enforcement is not
just to force people to comply when they are in the presence of police; rather
the objective is to build ongoing, voluntary compliance. 101 Psychologists
Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo argue that a regulation system that is perceived as
fair and trustworthy will induce the public to "[take] on personal
responsibility for adhering to those decisions and [do] so even when legal
authorities are unlikely to still be watching or sanctioning them.', 0 2 Drawing
from their psychology backgrounds, Drs. Tyler and Huo contend that trust
99 This distrust is not unnoticed by members of law enforcement. Police told
journalists from Indianapolis that "[d]istrust of police is a key problem that needs to be
overcome." Vic Ryckaert, Police Hope Cooperation from Public Continues,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 11, 2008, at Al. Indianapolis Public Schools Police Chief
Steve Garner stated that this is a problem mostly felt by minorities: "There's a distrust of
police... I've seen what I would call a wall built up." Id. at A6.
100 Ditkoff, supra note 51. In response to this, defense attorney Margaret Mead
commented, "Have you been over to the city jail? Talk about a place of witness
intimidation. If I thought I was going to get locked up in Baltimore City Jail, Mr.
Prosecutor, I'm going to say whatever you want me to say." Id.
101 TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 7.
102 Id. The idea of fairness directly feeds into the notion of trust in the law. In a
sociological study of street criminals and the code on the street, Richard Rosenfeld
interviewed twenty active street offenders. Richard Rosenfeld, et. al., Snitching and the
Code on the Street, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 291, 295 (2003). He found that most
offenders did not dispute the police's authority to patrol, investigate, and arrest; however
these interviewees perceived most officers as "[spending] most of their time engaging in
unjustified intrusions on the civil liberties. .. specifically, their right to be on the street."




within the law can be built by increasing the quality of the decision-making
process and then virtuously applying the resultant decisions on the public.
0 3
In the context of Supreme Court decisions, Dr. Tyler has argued that "an
examination of the psychology of procedural justice suggests that judgments
about the [Supreme] Court's neutrality are central to evaluations of the
legitimacy of the Court's decisionmaking procedures."'04 In other words, the
logical process and reasoning that the Supreme Court uses to formulate its
holdings should be sound in order for trust to develop between the public and
the law. 105 Of course, the vast majority of the public are not scrutinizing
Supreme Court decisions; however, the Fourth Amendment is unique in that
its rule of law is felt nearly every time a person interacts with a police
officer. The sheer breadth of the Fourth Amendment covers common
occurrences that even the most law-abiding citizen would not be able to
avoid. 0 6 By being the subject of police power, the public indubitably and
perhaps inadvertently learns what the Supreme Court has ruled. As
Baltimore's State's Attorney noted, "distrust between citizens and the law
can affect all aspects of law enforcement in the city." 107 Once this distrust
builds through repeated negative experiences with the police, it becomes
difficult to overcome that resentment when citizens are called upon to act as
jurors, or arguably, when they are called upon to help the police in solving
crime.
08
103 TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 7.
104 Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
DUKE L.J. 703, 798 (1994) (ultimately arguing that the amount of trust placed in the
Supreme Court's power and decision making process substantially affects the amount of
deference given to the Court's holding in abortion rights).
105 In a complex study, the psychologists found support for their hypothesis that
when police and the courts act in a way that are perceived as procedurally fair, then the
public is more apt to voluntarily give their cooperation-either when citizens are being
protected or being regulated by the police. TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 52-57.
The results from this study show that "procedural justice was the dominant factor in
shaping people's reactions to authorities in personal encounters with them . I... d  at 56.
106 The Fourth Amendment has been paramount in governing at least two every day
aspects of life: traffic stops and airline baggage searches. In Ohio alone, there were
748,655 traffic stops made by Ohio State Highway Patrol between January and June
2007. Ohio State Highway Patrol, Traffic Stop Data,
http://statepatrol.ohio.gov/statistics/data/2007_3T.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008). In 2000,
there were a total number of 638,902,933 enplaned passengers across all carriers. U.S.
DEP'T. OF TRANSP., AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF CERTIFICATED AIR CARRIERS:
SUMMARY TABLES 9 (2000), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
airport-activitystatistics of certificated air carriers/2000/entire.pdf.
107 Ditkoff, supra note 51.
108 Id.
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In the 1990s, a significant amount of legal scholarship was written about
the distrust that African Americans had engendered toward law
enforcement.' 9 Two areas where the Fourth Amendment has allowed for the
use of police deception are pre-textual vehicle stops and the seizure of people
on the street. 10 The Fourth Amendment facially mandates that all warrantless
searches or seizures are per se unreasonable; yet through a complicated path
of exceptions, this once-strong rule has severely lost its potency.' 11 In the
process, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of a
traffic stop does not take into consideration the actual motivations of the
individual policeman, 1 2 and the Court has established that a person is legally
seized when he or she does not feel free to leave a policeman's presence due
109 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters "-Some Preliminary
Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv.
243, 255 (1991) [hereinafter Maclin, Black and Blue]; see also, Harris, supra note 18, at
308. A complete analysis of the causes of distrust are beyond the scope of this Note;
however, it remains clear that this hostility had been identified and cautioned for at least a
decade before Stop Snitching reached its tipping point.
110 Police are often able to craft elaborate lies in order to elicit a confession from a
suspect. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). In Fraizer, the Court held that simply
lying to the suspect will not render an otherwise voluntary confession automatically
unconstitutional under the due process clause. Id. This same policy was later reinforced
when the Court held that if there were no other coercive factors influencing the
confession, then using deception was not in violation of the suspect's Miranda rights.
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990). Police generally believe that deceptive
interrogation is necessary due to the suspect's inherent reluctance to respond to direct
questioning. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REv. 775, 787 (1997). Falsely stating to a suspect that a co-
conspirator had already confessed is acceptable use of police deception. Frazier, 394 U.S.
at 737-38. Police are allowed to tell individuals that there is strong incriminating
evidence against them, even if none exists. State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 793 (N.J.
Super. 2003) (but making clear that police may not falsely create fake evidence to use in
interrogation). Investigators are even permitted (under Miranda) to pose as cellmates and
purposely elicit incriminating statements from the suspect. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296. In
the past, however, the Supreme Court has not always been so lenient toward police. See
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319 (1959). In Spano, the police used the suspect's
close friend, also a police officer, to tell a series of lies to the suspect in order to elicit a
confession. Id. These lies included that the suspect was going to lose his job, and that his
unemployment would harm his family. Id. at 323. The Court concluded that the suspect's
"will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely aroused... " Id
at 323 (emphasis added). Yet even here, deception alone did not lead to an
unconstitutional confession per se; it was the combination of multiple factors.
I I I Some of the multiple exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
are exigent circumstances, searches incident to lawful arrest, searches of readily mobile
vehicles, items in plain view, searches done under consent, protective sweeps, and arrest
or automobile inventories.
112 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816-17 (1996).
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to force or show of authority.1 3 As benign as these two holdings are, the true
effect lies between the lines of the written opinions. Both holdings have
created gaps through which policemen are legally allowed to use deception
against citizens for impermissible reasons-such as race. This Note is neither
contending nor assuming that policemen are generally unethical individuals.
Instead, it asserts that the Supreme Court has faltered by creating holes in the
precedent that permits the possibility of misuse. By creating these loopholes,
the Supreme Court's ability to garner the public's trust decreases." 
4
B. Pre-Textual Vehicle Stops are Just the Start
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Whren v. United States set a
precedent for permitting pre-textual stops.11 5 The police can now pull over a
vehicle for any reason, as long as there was some objective basis why they
could have effected the stop."16 When this holding is combined with the
decisions in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista" 7 and New York v. Belton,' 8 a
startling gap in the Fourth Amendment suddenly becomes clear: police now
have a means of lawfully searching a vehicle and seizing its occupants
without a warrant, spurred only by a mere hunch. "9
1. The Pre-Textual Stop is Born
One night in Washington D.C., an unmarked police car driven by a
plainclothes officer drove past a Nissan Pathfinder truck carrying youthful
looking occupants. 120 The policeman saw the driver look down at his lap, all
while remaining stopped at an intersection for an unusual amount of time.'
2
'
The police car did a U-turn toward the Pathfinder, and the truck immediately
sped off with a right turn.122 The officer followed, and while he was
113 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 545, 554 (1980).
114 See TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 57.
115 Whren, 517 U.S. at 817.
16 Id.
117 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
118 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981).
119 See David A. Sldansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 272 (1997).
120 Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
121 Id. The record for the case indicated that the Petitioner had waited at the stop
sign for "more than 20 seconds." Id.
122 Id.
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apprehending the Pathfinder's occupants in a traffic stop, he saw two plastic
bags of crack cocaine in Mr. Whren's hands.123
The driver moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that the stop of
his truck had not been justified by probable cause or even reasonable
suspicion of illegal drug activity. 12 4 However, the Court rejected his
arguments and the Justices unanimously decided that probable cause to stop a
car is to be judged by a purely objective standard. 125 Specifically, the Court
held that "[s]ubjective intentions [of the police officer] play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.' 2 6 In other words,
courts will not inquire into the 'real' reason an officer pulls over a car, as
long as there was a reasonable purpose for the stop-any reasonable
purpose-as judged by an objective analysis. 127 The petitioner-defendant lost
in Whren because when he broke the traffic laws, he opened the door to a
vehicle stop--even if the stop resulted in seized narcotics rather than a traffic
ticket. 128 With this holding, the Court effectively constitutionalized pre-
textual vehicle stops.
129
Although the petitioner-defendant proffered the losing standard in this
case, 130 he made a strong argument pointing out a looming loophole in pre-
textual stops. The standard adopted by the Court turns a blind eye toward the
subjective intentions of the police officer. Therefore, police can now track a
vehicle that they have some sort of hunch is involved in illegal activity.13 1
123 Id. at 808-9.
124 Id. at 809. Probable cause is found when there is a fair probability that
contraband of evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). The standard for reasonable suspicion is even less than that of
probable cause but must always be something more than a hunch. Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 328-29 (1990). Either standard is not particularly strict-probable cause does
not "demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false."
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
125 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 808.
129 Id. at 814.
130 Petitioner argued for the 'would have test', which asks whether an independent,
reasonable officer would have stopped the car. Id. at 813-15.
131 A hunch has never been enough to meet either the probable cause standard or the
lower standard of reasonable suspicion. Concerning the latter, police are forbidden from
acting solely on the basis of an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or a 'hunch."'
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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This hunch may be based on true observable clues, or it may be based on
something as impermissible as race.
132
The decision in Whren is quite controversial 133 since it creates a critical
gateway into further investigation. 34 This loophole of pre-textual stops is
closed by the Supreme Court's holding that police may arrest an individual
for a minor traffic violation and then use the arrest as a pretext to search the
entire vehicle. When an arrest is made at or near a vehicle, the officer is
entitled to search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle.'35 This per
se right to search the vehicle after a custodial arrest gives officers a
"compelling... incentive to execute custodial arrests for minor offenses so
that they can uncover evidence for 'good busts.',,' 36 There are two cases,
taken together, that create this significant Fourth Amendment gap: Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista and New York v. Belton.
132 Harris, supra note 18, at 318-19.
133 Despite its unanimous holding, the decision itself is quite far reaching and
controversial in that respect. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 126 (4th ed. 2006).
134 When a police officer starts with a hunch about a suspicious vehicle and then
stops the car for a traffic violation such as a seatbelt violation, the officer has an
opportunity to ask permission to search the car. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus
Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 158. (2002). For
various reasons, people experience a strong need to consent to police authority, so the
likelihood that someone will consent to a search is very high. Professor Nadler applies
this research in the context of refusing to give consent for a bus sweep search; however,
the same research is also relevant in analyzing the anxiety people feel when pressured to
give consent to a vehicle search. Id. See infra Part IV.C for application of Professor
Nadler's arguments of consent toward the seizure of people under the Fourth
Amendment.
135 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). The holding in Belton is limited
to circumstances where the police intercepted the suspect in his vehicle and then arrested
him. However, the Supreme Court even went further to hold that if a recent occupant of a
vehicle is arrested, police can still conduct a search incident to lawful arrest-even if
initial contact with the suspect was made only after the suspect left his vehicle. Thornton
v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
136 Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal. The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte
Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 442 (2002).
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2. Custodial Arrest Carte Blanche137
In March of 1997, Gail Atwater was pulled over with her two small
children in the backseat for violating a misdemeanor traffic law: failing to
wear a safety belt. 138 Although state law in Texas authorizes warrantless
arrests for these violations, police are allowed to issue a citation in lieu of
arrest. 39 Despite this, Lago Vista police officer Bart Turek decided to place
Ms. Atwater under arrest. 40 Ms. Atwater was put in a patrol vehicle, taken to
the police station, and asked to remove her accessories and empty her
pockets. After her mug shot was taken, Ms. Atwater was placed in jail for an
hour, thus equating to a custodial arrest. 14 1 She then sued the city and the
chief of police on grounds that her Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures had been violated, ultimately arguing that custodial
137 As a result of Atwater, some professors went so far as to hint that the Supreme
Court gave the police "constitutional carte blanche," or an unrestricted authority to use
their own discretion. Logan, supra note 136, at 422. The phrase was also used in relation
to the Atwater case by Justice O'Connor in her dissent. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 365-66
("Giving police officers constitutional carte blanche to effect an arrest whenever there is
probable cause to believe a fine-only misdemeanor has been committed is irreconcilable
with the Fourth Amendment's command that seizures be reasonable.") (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
138 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-24.
139 Id. at 323. Officer Turek asked to see Ms. Atwater's identification, but when she
said that she did not have her papers because her purse had been stolen the day before,
Officer Turek said that he had "heard that story two-hundred times." Id. at 324. By this
point, the children were "frightened, upset, and crying," and the officer refused to allow
Ms. Atwater to take her children to a neighbor's house during the arrest. Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. The significance of 'custodial arrest' will become apparent in the context of
Belton, which only allows a car search if a valid custodial arrest has already been made.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)
(warrantless, simultaneous search incident to lawful arrest of the arrestee is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment without any other additional justification). The incentives
to effect a full custodial arrest for minor violations grew exponentially after the Supreme
Court ruled that a full search of a vehicle, after issuing only a traffic citation, was
unconstitutional. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). In Knowles, an Iowa police
officer pulled over the defendant for speeding, and even though this was an arrestable
offense under Iowa law, the officer instead decided to issue only a citation. Id. at 114. By
executing what the officer thought was a valid "search incident to [a] lawful citation"
(because there was no custodial arrest), the officer found marijuana. Id. at 115-16.
However, the Supreme Court held that no such exception existed and that the bright line
rule from Belton applied only when full custodial arrests were actually effected. Id. at
118-19. Due to this result, police now have a strong incentive to take people into custody
for even minor traffic violations, if only to trigger the Belton bright line rule. See Belton,
453 U.S. at 460.
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arrests should not be allowed for such minor offenses. 4 2 As a practical
matter, her argument would allow police officers to make custodial arrests
for only "jailable" offenses, or when the government has shown a
"compelling need for immediate detention.' 43
The Court rejected Ms. Atwater's distinction for custodial arrests; instead
it opted to create a bright line rule: the Fourth Amendment allows an officer
to make a full custodial arrest for even minor violations.' 44 Justice Souter,
writing for a 5-4 majority, argued that it was simply too difficult for police
officers to make the distinction between "jailable" and "fine only" offenses at
the time of the arrest.1 45 The Court proudly unveiled an unambiguous
constitutional rule, but in exchange for clarity, the majority turned a blind
eye toward the ways in which its newly created standard could lead to
abuse. 146 Even more alarmingly, the Court embraced its bright line rule
despite recognizing that it would lead to the wrong result when applied to
Ms. Atwater's case. 47 The majority noted that Officer Turek's actions were
at best a representation of extremely poor judgment; indeed, the Court
concluded that Ms. Atwater's right to be free from needless indignity
"clearly outweigh[ed]" Lago Vista's interest in effecting an arrest.148
Nevertheless, the Court brazenly tossed aside a case-by-case analysis and
eagerly embraced a bright line rule-admittedly producing an incorrect
verdict.
Aside from being counterintuitive, openly adopting a standard that
inadequately decides the case at hand only hurts the public's trust in the
law. 149 This is exactly the kind of decision-making and illogicality that
142 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325. Specifically, Atwater argued that because a police
officer's authority to effect a warrantless arrest was restricted under traditional common
law, then custodial arrests for such minor offenses should be restricted now as well. Id. at
326-27. The Supreme Court rejected this line of reasoning but noted that her argument
was "by no means insubstantial." Id. at 327.
143 Id. at 346, 348.
144 Id. at 349-50.
145 Id. at 348-49. Instead of having to decide whether the arrest would be "necessary
for enforcement of the traffic laws or [whether an] offense would otherwise continue and
pose a danger to others on the road," police officers now just have to decide if a traffic
violation has occurred. Id. at 349 (quoting Petitioner-Atwater's Brief).
146 Logan, supra note 136, at 438-39.
147 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346.
148 Id. at 347.
149 See TRuST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 52-57; see also Leslie A. Lunney, The
(Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and its Progeny, 79 TUL. L.
REv. 365, 390 (2004). Professor Lunney contends that bright line rules are inevitably
arbitrary since lines must be drawn, yet it nevertheless does not justify drawing a line that
is both arbitrary and ostensibly wrong. Id.
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fosters distrust in both the law, and by extension, in the police.' 50 In her
dissent, Justice O'Connor expressed her opposition to the majority's bright
line rule while squarely pointing out the logical loopholes that would
result.51 She reasoned that because there are so many minor traffic violations
at a policeman's disposal,'5 2 he now has "unfettered discretion" to use one of
those traffic provisions as a gateway to further search and seize a driver-by
arresting the occupants, searching the vehicle, or impounding the car and
inventorying all of its contents' 53-without giving a single reason why such
action is reasonable.' 54 In building upon the gaps observed by Justice
O'Connor, Professor Logan argues: "Of equal if not greater concern, such
unbounded discretion threatens that police will enforce the law
discriminatorily, a concern expressly downplayed by the Atwater majority,
yet persistently evidenced on America's streets with socially toxic effects."'
' 55
By combining the holdings from Whren and Atwater, a police officer
may follow a suspicious car until the driver makes some sort of traffic
violation. As the petitioner-defendant from Whren noted, "the use of
automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with
traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost
invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation.', 56
This is the gap that the Supreme Court leaves open: police officers are given
the freedom to investigate their hunches by following cars and stopping them
when they "violate" minor traffic laws. Since anything from not wearing a
seatbelt to not stopping long enough at a stop sign can be cited, police now
have a whole litany of possible reasons to stop a car-even if the true reasons
they were suspicious of cars in the first place were for improper reasons. 157
150 Lunney, supra note 149, at 390.
151 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152 See Harris, supra note 18, at 311-12. Professor Harris writes that although police
technically need some sort of reason to stop a car, they virtually always have it via the
myriad of minor traffic violations, even though they might not witness more egregious
criminal activity. Id. This makes it very easy under current law to stop a vehicle to search
it and question the occupants with no more evidence than a hunch. Id.
153 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987)); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976) (police may conduct warrantless searches of impounded vehicles in order to
inventory contents found inside).
154 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155 Logan, supra note 136, at 439.
156 Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
157 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 18, at 271 (recounting anecdote of an African
American woman who believes she was arrested and placed in the back of a police car
solely on account of her race.).
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An improper reason can range from racial discrimination to just an arbitrary,
unsupported hunch or feeling. Nonetheless, whatever inappropriate basis for
targeting a certain vehicle is relied upon, "police know that they can use the
traffic code to their advantage, and they utilize it to stop vehicles for many
nontraffic enforcement purposes."' 58 Therefore, current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has transgressed its purpose as a restriction on police power,
and transformed instead into a medium of police strategy. 1
59
3. Your Passenger Compartment Becomes Your Grabbing Area
In efforts to provide a more straightforward rule with regard to the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that a driver's entire
passenger compartment can be searched incident to a lawful arrest-without
a warrant, without probable cause, and even without an exigency. 16° This
holding came in response to a vehicle stop effected by Trooper Douglas
Nicot on the New York Thruway in 1978.161 Once the car was stopped,
Trooper Nicot asked the driver for his license and registration. However, the
car was not owned or traceable to any of the vehicle's four occupants. 162
After smelling marijuana in the car, 163 the officer ordered each of the four
individuals out of the vehicle, placed them all under arrest, put them in
handcuffs, and separated them so that none of them could touch any other.' 64
After removing all of the occupants, the officer found cocaine in a jacket that
158 Id. at 311-12.
159 See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1089 (5th Cir. 1993). In
Roberson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the seizure of
drugs found during a search of a vehicle that had mismatched plates. Id. at 1092. The
defendant claimed that the stop was a mere pretext, but the search was upheld regardless,
despite strong evidence that the traffic stop was being used as an investigatory tool. Id. In
fact, during the five years prior to Roberson, the same officer "had arrested 250 people on
drug charges, all after traffic stops." Id. at 1092 (emphasis added). The court even bluntly
admitted that it had "become familiar with Trooper Washington's propensity for
patrolling the Fourth Amendment's outer frontier." Id. The Fifth Circuit disapproved of
the officer's propensity to "use technical violations as a cover for exploring for more
serious violations," but could not hold the search unconstitutional because there had been
a legitimate basis for stopping the vehicle (the mismatched license plates). Id.
160 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
161 Id. at 455.
162 Id.
163 The officer also spotted a container labeled, "Supergold," which he associated
with the drug. Id. at 455-6.
164 Id. at 456.
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was inside the passenger compartment. 165 The owner of the jacket, Roger
Belton, was indicted for criminal possession, and his motion to suppress the
drug was denied.
66
The Supreme Court's holding in Belton was a sharp divergence from
previous case law.' 67 In 1969, the Court reasoned that the area to be searched
incident to a lawful arrest is strictly limited to the immediate control of the
arrestee.' 68 The justification for this rule stemmed mostly from concerns over
the safety of the arresting officer and the preservation of evidence. 169 A
search of the 'grabbing area' was reasonable to remove weapons that the
arrestee might use in offense against the officer, and to prevent the arrestee
from concealing or destroying evidence. 70 The logic of this justification rests
in the assumption that arrests are generally volatile occurrences, with much
of the upper hand in the favor of the arrestee. 71 Often these warrantless
arrests are made in unfamiliar settings to the officer, and therefore the Court
is much more amenable toward giving policemen reasonable lenience within
the Fourth Amendment in order to protect their safety. 72 In general, the
Court is afraid that that the arrestee will gain access to a hidden weapon or
reach concealed evidence and destroy it.1 73 The key to this logic is that the
arrestee must in some way be able to access an item. In fact, the Court in
Chimel held that this search warrant exception does not apply to areas that
are outside of the arrestee's immediate grabbing area. 74 The majority
165 Id. Although the jacket was inside the vehicle, the officer had to unzip the jacket
pocket in order to find the drug. He also opened a closed envelope and found marijuana
inside. Id.
166 Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
167 See Lunney, supra note 149, at 381. Professor Lunney notes that while Belton
did resolve the issue of whether a warrant was needed for this type of search, "the
underlying tensions between Chimel's articulated purposes and the scope of searches
incident to arrest remained." Id. This tension exists despite the Belton Court's attempt to
preserve Chimel. Id. at 460 n. 3.
168 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.; see infra note 260 (listing search warrant exceptions created to protect the
safety of police officers).
172 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763
17 3 Id. The Court wrote, "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested." Id.
174 Id. at 754, 763. Specifically, the Court held that a whole house (room by room)
search was unconstitutional since there was no way that the arrestee could have reached




opinion in Chimel v. California, written by Justice Stewart, makes complete
sense: to allow an arresting officer to search the limited and immediate
grabbing area is to preclude the arrestee from gaining access to weapons or
evidence.' 75
Despite this ostensibly clear rule, the law had trouble setting the exact
boundaries of the "grabbing area." Defining the scope becomes more
difficult when the arrest takes place in a vehicle on a roadway, as in
Belton.176 The Court took certiorari to resolve the circuit split,177 and
surprisingly, the majority nearly defied the logical justification established in
Chimel. Justice Stewart once again wrote the majority opinion, but this time
he held that when an arrest is effected in a vehicle, the officer is
constitutionally allowed to search the entire passenger compartment of the
vehicle.1 78 The Court just assumed that this compartment of the car is always
within the grabbing area of an arrestee.
However, the holding of Belton suffers from conspicuous logical flaws,
the first of which is that the four arrested individuals in the vehicle search
were no where near the vehicle. In fact, not only were they handcuffed, but
they were sequestered and separated from each other and the car. 179 There
was no possibility that the passenger compartment of the vehicle from which
they were removed was within their literal grabbing area.180 The justification
laid out in Chimel simply does not apply to a search of a vehicle when the
arrestee is removed from it and physically restrained by locked handcuffs. A
weapon left in the vehicle, however secret it may be, probably cannot be used
offensively by a driver who is standing outside of the automobile. If the
officer is only justified in looking for weapons that will be used against him,
it makes more sense to search the driver's body, not the car from which he
was just taken.
175 Id. at 763.
176 Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
177 Id. at 459.
178 Id. at 460.
179 Id. at 456.
180 Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of A Person: An Empirical Reexamination
of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIs. L. REv. 657, 692 (2002). This is not even the result of
post-hoc reasoning, since Professor Moskovitz notes that various police manuals, in
addition to common sense, require-if not mandate-that the arrestee must be
handcuffed and removed from the car before it is searched. Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
The professor contacted various police departments who were very protective of their
police manuals, presumably so criminals do not counteract them. Id. However, the police
departments that did respond all had manuals that ordered the officer to handcuff and
then get the arrestee away from the scene as soon as possible. Id. In the police manuals
that Professor Moskovitz cited, all commanded that the arrestee be handcuffed and
secured before any searching begins. Id.
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The second major flaw of the decision is that the Court defined a
"passenger area" far too broadly given the policy justifications for a search
incident to a lawful arrest.'18 If the reasons from Chimel were carried over to
vehicles, then only the area where a suspect could immediately gain access to
a hidden weapon or evidence could be subject to this type of warrantless
search. 8 2 Despite characterizing the passenger compartment as "relatively
narrow," the Court ironically extended the scope beyond the immediate
grabbing area of the driver (the area around the driver's seat and the console,
etc.) and into the passenger area, the backseat, and any containers-opened
or closed-including the glove compartment. 183 The Court in Belton made
this explicitly clear when it stated:
Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or
closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no
privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies
the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.1
8 4
Normally, a closed container inside a vehicle can only be searched
(absent custodial arrest) if there is probable cause that the container contains
contraband and is inside of the vehicle. 185 However, the over-extension of the
181 Lunney, supra note 149, at 383 (noting that when courts extended Belton's
bright line rule there was only a 'tenuous connection', at best, to the twin Chimel
purposes). Skeptical of Belton's ties to Chimel, Justice O'Connor also characterized the
justification for such a broad bright line rule as a "shaky foundation." United States v.
Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). A five Justice
majority in Thornton ruled that Belton's bright line rule applied even to arrestees who
have left their vehicles, but were "recent occupants" of it. Id. at 623-24; see also supra
note 135. Based only upon a "shaky foundation," the Belton rule becomes divorced from
its original justification in Chimel. Without a strong connection between the bright line
rule and its rationale, future courts are at a major disadvantage in applying the rule in new
circumstances-since the justification itself has been rendered null. Lunney, supra note
149, at 392. Therefore, the Court is forced to define the rule's parameters using the
language of the rule itself instead of determining whether the extension legitimately
furthers the original policy goals in Chimel (police safety and preservation of evidence).
Id. The way the Court has cornered itself is evident in the Court's holding in Thornton:
the majority held onto its bright line rule despite admitting that it was unlikely a suspect
could have even reached a weapon or evidence under the driver's seat when he was
outside of the car. Id. at 622. Professor Lunney characterized the Thornton decision as
inevitable, since without the Chimel goals to rest its reasoning on, the "Court had no
choice but to extend its analytical fiction ... " Lunney, supra note 149, at 392.
182 Lunney, supra note 149, at 367.
183 Id. at 366; Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
184 Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
185 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991). The warrantless search of a
container within a vehicle has its own tumultuous history within the Supreme Court. See
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Chimel doctrine allows police to bypass this probable cause requirement
when they make a custodial arrest. Therefore, in a search incident to a lawful
arrest near a vehicle, police do not have to assess whether they have probable
cause to search a container that is coincidentally inside the automobile.
Instead, much to Justice O'Connor's dismay, it is now an entitlement.'86
Once again, the Court's preference for a bright line rule falters due to its
over-inclusiveness. The law guiding police officers is now clear: make a
valid arrest of a driver, and one is fully entitled to search the passenger
compartment of the car. But the illogic of this ruling allows for an
astonishing exploitation of the Fourth Amendment-the police can dispose
of the warrant requirement even when no exigency exists."'
4. Putting it all Together: A Hypothetical
Through the line of cases stemming from Knowles, Whren, Atwater, and
Belton, the lenience toward deception under the current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is unmistakable. The gap of deception that the Supreme Court
has allowed through this line of cases is perhaps best elucidated by a
hypothetical.
A policeman gets a tip that a green pickup truck may be involved with
drug possession. 8 8 The officer drives to the intersection where the drug
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled byAcevedo, 500 U.S. at 579. As the
law currently stands, probable cause is needed to open and search a closed container
placed inside of a vehicle-assuming that there has not been a custodial arrest. See
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579.
186 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurrence in part). Justice O'Connor
noted that the extension of Belton's bright line rule to individuals who have just left their
vehicles is suspect and that "lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search
a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as
an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel." Id. The Supreme Court later
adknowledged that Justice O'Connor's reservations about the Belton rule have turned
into reality: "[Belton] has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to
the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access
to the vehicle at the time of the search." Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542 (U.S. Apr. 21,
2009).
187 Moskovitz, supra note 180, at 674.
188 This one tip alone, not being incredibly detailed or specific, would fail meeting
the probable cause threshold. Under the totality of circumstances, it is unclear how
reliable or accurate this statement is-moreover, the police do not know how reliable this
tipster is, nor how the tipster became privy to this information. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 231 (1983). It is also mostly a descriptive rather than a prescriptive tip; therefore it
would probably fail the reasonable suspicion threshold as well. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266, 272 (2000) (for a tip to meet reasonable suspicion it must be more than just an
accurate description; the tip must provide predictive information that police can
corroborate).
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transaction is supposedly taking place and sees a vehicle matching the tip.
The occupant inside is not displaying any overt illegal actions, yet the officer
remains suspicious. He watches the vehicle stop at a stop sign, but the driver
fails to signal his intention for a turn. The officer decides to follow this car,
then flashes his lights and pulls the car over. When he approaches the driver,
the policeman mentions that the reason why he stopped the car was for the
failure to signal. Yet, curiously, the officer asks to search the vehicle, and the
driver, feeling nervous and scared, agrees. During this initial search, nothing
is found. The officer decides now to call in a K-9 unit even though there is
nothing to support the suspicion of drug use other than the initial tip. The
stop has now taken over an hour, and when the K-9 finally comes, no
evidence of narcotics is found. The policeman, having called backup, places
the driver under arrest for the traffic violation, 189 although admittedly, the
officer's real reason for the arrest related to possible drug possession. 190 The
officer searches the driver's person, his clothes, and the entire passenger
compartment,' 9' where the officer finds 200 grams of methamphetamine.
What is most notable about this scenario is that it all started with a tip
that did not by itself amount to reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Yet
from this initial "hunch" the officer was able to stay within the Fourth
Amendment confines and legally maneuver through the gaps in the law to
finally make a successful search. But note the anomaly of this situation: if the
officer only stopped the vehicle for the failure to signal, there is really no
need to search the vehicle or even ask to search it once the traffic citation is
issued. 192 Asking consent to search may not even be based on a reasonable
189 This full custodial arrest is justified under Atwater. 532 U.S. at 346.
Hypothetically, this police officer knows he wants to search the vehicle, so to do so
legally, he has a strong incentive to arrest. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 114.
190 The pre-textual stop is expressly allowed under Whren. 517 U.S. at 816-17. The
officer's subjective intentions for an arrest are irrelevant as long as there is an objective
basis for the arrest-in this case, the traffic violation.
191 By applying Belton, the search of the entire passenger compartment is justified
even without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
The search of the arrestee's person is constitutional due to United States v. Robinson. 414
U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
192 Professor Maclin noted that police often ask motorists whom they have pulled
over a litany of questions that have nothing to do with the ostensible purpose of the stop.
Tracey Maclin, Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More Questions Than
Answers, 31 CHAMPION 34 (2007) [Hereinafter Maclin, Traffic Stops]. In one instance, a
policeman stopped a vehicle for speeding and then proceeded to ask the driver over fifty
questions during the stop, including whether there were drugs and weapons inside the
car-despite the fact that the driver did not exhibit any suspicious conduct. Maxwell v.
State, 785 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Professor Maclin argues that if the
driver in these types of scenarios denies possession of illegal items, it triggers the
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belief that contraband will be found inside the vehicle. 93 Instead, as
Professor Maclin argues, this absurdity of running through a barrage of
scripted questions is meant to exploit the vulnerability of an automobile
driver who has been caught in a police seizure.194 Through these gaps left
open in the Fourth Amendment, the scrutiny of such behavior slips through
the cracks, and the illogicality of needing to search remains unquestioned.
The problem with each of these holdings (Knowles, Whren, Atwater, and
Belton) is that individually, they are mostly benign, yet this line of cases can
be strewn together to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. Although this
scenario was posed as a hypothetical, it is in fact a real case involving real
individuals. 95 This case demonstrates that the loopholes within the Fourth
Amendment are being taken advantage of by the police. 196 As guided by the
Supreme Court, the court held that the evidence was lawfully obtained and
denied its suppression.1
97
policeman to ask consent to search, even though this bears little relevance to the traffic
stop. Maclin, Traffic Stops, supra, at 34.
193 Maclin, Traffic Stops, supra note 192, at 34.
194 Id.
195 State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (en bane). Although the
hypothetical version remains materially the same, some of the facts have been slightly
changed.
196 This validity of exploiting these loopholes was recently challenged in the
Supreme Court of the United States. See Arizona v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007),
cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2008 (No. 07-542)) [Hereinafter Gant II].
In the lower court decision, the Arizona State Supreme Court ruled that a warrantless
search of the defendant's vehicle, while the defendant was handcuffed and sitting inside a
locked patrol car, was not justified under the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v. Gant, 162
P.3d 640, 643 (Ariz. 2007) [Hereinafter Gant 1]. The court could not see how the safety
justifications in Chimel applied to a sequestered individual and held that when an arrestee
"is secured and thus presents no reasonable risk to officer safety or the preservation of
evidence, a search warrant must be obtained." Gant 1, 162 P.3d at 646. In its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, the State argued that Belton did not require a retrospective, case-by-
case analysis to determine whether an actual risk to the police officer existed; thus the
Arizona court effectively "overruled" the Supreme Court. Brief of Petitioner at 10,
Arizona v. Gant, 2007 WL 3129919 (No. 07-542). Stressing the twin justifications under
Chimel, the Defendant-Respondent countered that a warrantless search is not always
permitted, even under the Belton-Thornton line of cases. Brief of Respondent, Arizona v.
Gant WL 244978 (No. 07-542). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of
whether the Fourth Amendment requires police officers "to demonstrate a threat to their
safety or a need to preserve evidence.., in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search
incident to arrest conducted after the... occupants have been ... secured." Gant II, at
* 1. For details on the Court's opinion, see infra notes 268-69.
197 State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (en banc). This was an
en banc opinion reviewing whether the Texas Court of Appeals trespassed on the trial
court's discretion in fact finding. Id.
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C. The Seizure of People
The other realm within the Fourth Amendment that is being plagued by
deception is the law governing the seizure of people. 98 Generally, people
have the liberty to move about as they please, free from police
interference.199 The standard for when exactly someone has been seized
under the Fourth Amendment200 has been set by two main cases: Terry v.
Ohio2°' and United States v. Mendenhall.20 2 The deception present in the
Terry-Mendenhall doctrine is the result of two missteps: first, the Supreme
Court failed to create a standard for seizures that is fairly applied in the real
world,203 and second, the Court has become complacent toward jurisprudence
that allows African Americans to have their freedom of movement curtailed
in stop and frisks far more than their white counterparts.2 4
1. When a Reasonable Person Would Feel Free to Leave-Really?
In 1968, the Supreme Court provided its first glimpse of how it would
determine whether a seizure of a person has occurred.05 In Terry, the Court
stated: "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
198 There is some slight overlap between the law of vehicular searches and the
seizure of people inside a stopped car; however, they are in fact two separate analyses
that fall under two different bodies of case law. Whereas the previous section concerned
warrantless vehicle searches, the present section discusses whether a seizure of an
individual (either on foot or in vehicle) is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
199 Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1259 (1990) [Hereinafter Maclin, Locomotion].
Professor Maclin calls this right the freedom of locomotion.
200 "The right of the people to be secure.., against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
201 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
202 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
203 Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 199, at 1300-01.
204 David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Frisking Every Suspect]; see also James Q.
Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 46
(arguing that stop and frisks should be increased to confiscate guns, even if it means that
young black and Hispanic men will be targeted more often).
205 Terry, 391 U.S. at 16-19. In Terry, a police officer noticed three suspicious
individuals 'casing' a warehouse. Id. at 6. The officer approached the individuals, spun
them around, and frisked them. Id. at 7. The officer found a concealed weapon in one of
the suspect's inside pockets. Id.
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conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred., 20 6 However, this would not remain
the black letter law for long. It was eventually replaced by a peculiar
plurality opinion carried only by two votes in United States v. Mendenhall,
which, through later cases, was adopted as law.20 7 The standard given by
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist transformed the Terry test into a totality of
circumstances analysis, asking whether an objectively reasonable person
would have believed that he or she was free to leave.20 8
On February 10, 1976, Ms. Mendenhall arrived at the Detroit airport,
where she was approached by two federal agents.20 9 The agents noticed that
her behavior seemed suspicious, it being similar to what they would expect
of someone who was smuggling narcotics.2 '0 They asked to see her ticket and
noticed that it had a different name than her identification, after which they
took her to a back room for questioning. 2 1 The agents searched Ms.
Mendenhall and her bag, where they found heroin.21 2 Applying the objective
standard, the Court looked to the totality of the circumstances 213 and
concluded that Ms. Mendenhall-a reasonable person-had no "objective
reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the
concourse and proceed on her way.,
214
The standard elucidated in Mendenhall begs two questions: when exactly
does a reasonable person feel free to walk away from a police officer; and
20 6 Id. at 19 n.16. The Terry opinion is best known for two points: first, it
established a seizure of a person as more of a sliding scale; second, it did so by allowing
officers to "stop and frisk" an individual for concealed weapons under less than probable
cause. Id. at 30-31. This 'less intrusive' version of a seizure does need to be supported by
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 22.
207 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist announced the
judgment of the Court, which reversed and remanded the case. Id. at 546. Justice Powell,
Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger concurred in parts I, liB, IIC and III and
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 560. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
dissented. Id. at 566 (White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
20 8 Id. at 545.
209 Id. at 547.
210 1d. Namely, the agents believed that she fit a 'drug courier profile': (1) she
arrived from Los Angeles; (2) she was the last person to deplane; (3) she did not claim
any baggage; and (4) she changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit. Id. at 547 n. 1.
211 Id. at 548.
212 Id. at 549.
213 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55. In support of his holding, Justice Stewart noted
that the event took place on a public concourse, the agents identified themselves, and they
had no weapons. Id. at 555.
214 Id. Compare with Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (plurality) (when
agents withheld ticket, passenger was effectively seized under the Fourth Amendment
since he objectively was not free to leave).
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whether the "reasonable person" is truly representative of the people who are
the most stopped? The inadequate way that the Supreme Court dealt with
these questions has fostered deception within the Fourth Amendment. The
Mendenhall opinion eventually produced the following understanding of
when a seizure takes place: "[A]s long as the person to whom [police]
questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away,
there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would
require some particularized and objective justification., 215 The significant
problem with this holding is that a vast majority of people simply do not feel
free to leave the presence of a police officer in the middle of a
conversation.216 As most people would not feel free to just drive away during
a traffic stop, most people likewise would not "feel free" to just walk away
from a police officer when they are being questioned--even if the right to
leave exists. Professor Nadler has written that "our script for interacting with
police officers undoubtedly involves ready cooperation and compliance with
requests." 217 The empirical evidence to date indicates that outsiders to the
actual exchange between the police and the individual systematically
overestimate the ability of that individual to walk away.218
The Supreme Court justices are themselves clear examples of such
"outsiders"; although their standard may work in chambers, it fails to
resemble how the public acts and feels when encountering police on the
streets. In its post-Mendenhall opinions, the Court has further limited the
instances where a seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs. Police may
now board a stopped bus at a station and interview all the occupants one by
one in their seats without infringing upon the Constitution, because they
assume that the occupants would feel free to get up and depart.21 9 The Court
did note that the officers did not draw weapons, they did not block the aisle,
and they spoke in quiet, polite voices. 220 However, the Court failed to
215 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 545.
2 16 Nadler, supra note 134, at 197 and accompanying text.
217 Nadler, supra note 134, at 197.
218 Id at 155-156.
219 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203-04 (2002). In this case, Mr. Drayton
was traveling on a Greyhound bus when it made a scheduled stop along the route. Id. at
197. Two plain clothes officers boarded the bus and, starting in the rear, worked their
way forward by asking the passengers questions and requesting to match them to their
luggage. Id. at 199. One of the officers asked Mr. Drayton to check his luggage and then
asked to search his person-both of which Mr. Drayton consented to. Id. Mr. Drayton
and another passenger filed a motion to suppress the contraband that was found, on
grounds that it was found only after an illegal seizure of his person. Id. Along with ruling
that Mr. Drayton was not seized, the Court ruled this consent was, in fact, valid. Id. at
200.
220 Id. at 203-204.
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recognize the inherent authority that police officers bring to a conversation
and how intimidated an individual might feel in that moment when speaking
to the police, regardless of the officer's tone of voice.221 In deciding that
there was no seizure-since a reasonable person would be free to terminate
the police encounter-the Court ignored the possibility that bus passengers
are extremely unlikely to exercise such a liberty.222 Therefore, an incongruity
remains between the theoretical application of the law and the way it actually
operates in real life.
Even more astonishingly, the Supreme Court has held that when police
enter a factory carrying firearms and block the exits, there still has been no
seizure of any of the individuals inside.223 In order to catch illegal
immigrants, the police would raid factories, randomly question each
employee, and request to see their identification.224 Despite previously setting
forth a totality of the circumstances, objective analysis which asked whether
a reasonable person would feel free to leave, 225 the Court instead framed the
question in Delgado as: does mere questioning by an officer amount to a
seizure of a person?226 In holding that factory sweeps do not amount to a
seizure of the people inside, the Court laid down the following reasoning. It
first noted that although the exits may have been blocked, the workers were
still able to move freely within the factory.227 Second, the Court merely
waived aside the fact there were agents at the doors, concluding that their
221 See Nadler, supra note 134, at 168. Additionally, after watching multiple other
passengers provide consent to the officers, "a reasonable innocent person in Drayton's []
shoes would have concluded that consenting [to the searches] was the correct thing to
do." Id. at 185.
222 Id. (citing Stanley Milgram, OBEDIENCE TO AuTHORITY 104 (Harper & Row,
1983)). Psychological research demonstrates that the general public complies with
authority-and often makes decisions that they would otherwise not make-when under
social pressure. Id. at 174. Furthermore, interdisciplinary studies covering the social
psychology of compliance, conformity, influence, and politeness indicate that "the extent
to which people feel free to refuse to comply is extremely limited under situationally
induced pressures." Id. at 155.
223 I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212, 218 (1984). To provide more detail,
multiple agents would enter the factory by surprise and then station themselves near the
exits while other agents would systematically move through the factory. Id. at 212. The
agents were armed, but no weapons were drawn. Id.
224 Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 199, at 1275; see also Delgado, 466 U.S. at
212-13. If, during the questioning, the agents received an acceptable answer, they would
then move on to the next individual; however, if the response was unsatisfactory, then the
employee had to produce his or her papers. Id.
225 See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
226 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
2 2 7 Id. at 218.
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purpose was to make sure all the individuals were questioned.228 Since
securing the entire factory was not a seizure, the only question remaining was
whether the individual interviews were seizures-which the Court answered
in the negative. 229 However, even if the guarding of the doors may have
served the purposes mentioned by the majority, the Court failed to concede
that it may have given individuals the impression that they were not free to
leave the factory. Instead, the only concession offered by Justice Rehnquist
was that surprise entry, systematic questioning, and blocked exits indirectly
limited the workers' freedom of movement to a small degree.23 ° Yet as
quickly as the inference was made, it was rendered null: "Ordinarily, when
people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully
restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers'
voluntary obligations to their employers., 231 This implies that by the mere
fact the factory employees showed up for work, they implicitly consented to
a limited expectation of locomotion; thus allowing themselves to be seized in
practice, but not by law.
In sum, critics of these holdings argue that in order to preserve the
police's discretion to stop and question individuals, the Court has been
forced to "adopt unrealistic and deceptive standards to resolve the question of
when a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment., 232 Professor Maclin has forcefully argued that the Mendenhall
rule exists in an unrealistic world, because in the real world, "few people are
aware of their Fourth Amendment rights, many individuals are fearful of the
police, and police officers know how to exploit this fear., 233 Although police
encounters are certainly not thought of by the Court as friend-to-friend
conversations, the Court still should not be allowed to turn a blind eye
toward the incongruence between the seizure of a person under the Fourth
Amendment and the seizure of an individual as defined by an ordinary
person. This inconsistency is then exacerbated by the increasingly lax Fourth
228 Id. In a somewhat brash explanation, the Court stated: "[The agent's presence at
the doors] should have given respondents no reason to believe that they would be
detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply
refused to answer." Id.
229 Id. at 219.
230 Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 199, at 1276.
231 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
232 Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 199, at 1284.
233 Id. at 1301. Professor Maclin emphasizes the absurdity of the Mendenhall
opinion with a rhetorical question: "If a person is unlikely to ignore an officer's
approach, and is equally unlikely to know of her right to depart, is the Court really
serious in believing that the average person will exercise her right to do so?" Id.
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Amendment guidelines that regulate when a police officer may stop and frisk
an individual.
2. The Automatic (and Arbitrary) Stop and Frisk
In Terry v. Ohio,2 34 the Court held that a somewhat less intrusive search
for weapons-a frisk235---could be made under a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the suspect is actually armed and dangerous.236 There are two
rationales for a Terry frisk: first, a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
committing or is about to commit a violent offense; or second, that the
suspect is armed.237 Although the Terry rule was constructed to be a very
narrow warrant exception, courts have continually extended the
constitutionality of the stop and frisk to other situations-both by expanding
the types of offenses considered violent and by labeling certain types of
people and places as always posing a risk to officer safety.23s This once-
234 For the basic facts in Terry, see supra note 205. For a more complete summary
of the case, including a detailed background of Detective McFadden, see John Q. Barrett,
Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72
ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 749, 784-793 (1998).
235 A frisk, as defined by the Terry Court, is a cursory search "confined in scope to
an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer." Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. The Court buried
in its opinion a real-life description of a frisk, taken from a police manual: "[T]he officer
must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search
must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet." Id. at 17 n. 13 (citing
L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
481, 481 (1954)). Another description instructs:
Check the subject's neck and collar. A check should be made under the subject's
arm. Next a check should be made of the upper back. The lower back should also be
checked. A check should be made of the upper part of the man's chest and the lower
region around the stomach. The belt, a favorite concealment spot, should be
checked. The inside thigh and crotch area also should be searched. The legs should
be checked for possible weapons. The last items to be checked are the shoes and
cuffs of the subject.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting J.
MOYNAHAN, POLICE SEARCHING PROCEDURES 7 (1963) (citations omitted)).
236 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Like many other exceptions, the Terry rule was justified to
protect police officer safety. Id. See infra note 260.
237 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
238 Harris, Frisking Every Suspect, supra note 204, at 5.
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focused exception has now grossly surpassed its original scope in Terry.239
Because the courts allow the police to stop and frisk individuals who could
be dangerous, the law is alarmingly close to authorizing an automatic right to
stop and frisk.240 Despite the growth of the Terry exception, the Supreme
Court has not intervened, thus passively permitting more rampant use of the
automatic stop and frisk. The deception within this area of the law stems
from this over-extension of the Terry doctrine. When a frisk is upheld for
reasons other than the two permitted under Terry-for example, when a
suspect flees unprovoked in a high crime area24 1-the law creates a loophole
by which police can arbitrarily choose who they want to stop and frisk.
In Illinois v. Wardlow, two officers were in an area known for heavy
narcotics trafficking and spotted Mr. Wardlow standing next to a building
holding an opaque bag.242 Mr. Wardlow turned around and ran away from the
uniformed officers, but he was caught as one of the officers chased after
him. 243 During a pat-down search of his body, the officer found a firearm and
ammunition.244 The Supreme Court upheld the search, reasoning that while
unprovoked fleeing is "not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, [it certainly
is] suggestive of such. 245 But more importantly, the Court ruled that
although unprovoked fleeing could not alone be the basis of reasonable
suspicion, as long as it was coupled with other factors, the Terry-level search
would be justified.24 One such factor in Wardlow relevant for consideration
was the location: the officers were in a "high crime area.,
247
239 Id. at 5-6. Justice Harlan gave a warning to lower courts to exercise caution
when allowing stop and frisks: "If the nature of the suspected offense creates no
reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety, I would not permit him to frisk unless
other circumstances did so." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). However, the warning did not prevent lower courts from stretching the twin
rationales for Terry frisks "out of shape." Harris, Frisking Every Suspect, supra note 204,
at 22.
240 Harris, Frisking Every Suspect, supra note 204, at 22-23.
241 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
242 Id. at 121-22.
243 Id. at 122.
2 4 4 Id. The Defendant was convicted for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, but
the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction on grounds that sudden flight did not
amount to reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a Terry level frisk. Id.
245 Id. at 124.
246 Id. ("[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a
location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant
further investigation."). This holding-that unprovoked fleeing in a high crime area
amounts to reasonable suspicion-has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Lenese C.
Herbert, Can't You See What I'm Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-
Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 135, 143-44 (2002). Indeed, there are
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The Court left the exact definition of "high crime area" noticeably vague
and instead deferred to the common sense judgments of the police.24' But
when the definition is left ambiguous, police are free to characterize almost
every location as a "high crime area.' 249 Not only is over-inclusiveness a
pressing concern, but police officers seem to "know" why a particular area is
more dangerous, deadly, or lawless without any real standards upon which to
base their conclusions. Due to the absence of clear guidelines, it is easier to
call a location a "high crime area" when what is really meant is that officers
are dealing with "high crime people"-those who are "poor, undereducated,
black and brown males who live in or frequent depressed (e.g., culturally,
educationally, socially, economically) inner-city neighborhoods." 250 Thus, a
loophole has been created within the law of Terry-level frisks: reasonable
suspicion can be based on expressive conduct in a high crime area, 251 and
because there is no clear guidance on what is a "high crime area,, 252 police
can use this as a fagade to arbitrarily target certain types of people-
especially African Americans. 3
Contrary to what the Court presumed, this arbitrariness is not usually
being used to achieve fairness on the streets. Instead, "[t]hose who police
would frisk most often, who would suffer most of the indignities this rule
would allow, are not distributed evenly across the population .... African-
Americans and Hispanic-Americans pay a higher personal price for
numerous reasons why an innocent person would prefer to run away from the police, the
least of which is just to avoid undue harassment. Id. at 145. Moreover, it makes little
sense to imbue more meaning in a person who runs away from police in a "high crime
area," rather than a "low crime area" unless it is believed that "only the guilty flee." The
Court has given a glimpse that it, in fact, supports such a view: in a majority opinion,
Justice Scalia quoted Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee when no man pursueth") to hint
that only people who "scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police" have
something to hide. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991). The dissenters
in Hodari D. called Justice Scalia's biblical allusion "gratuitous" and flatly rejected the
majority's claim that "only the guilty flee." Id. at 630.
247 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
248 Id. at 125 (noting that exact scientific certainty is an unrealistic expectation;
reasonable suspicion will be based on common sense determinations and judgments
about human behavior).
249 Herbert, supra note 246, at 135.
250 Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
251 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
252 Nor do judges ever challenge a policeman's opinion that a certain location is a
"high crime area." Herbert, supra note 246, at 135.
253 Id. at 136. Professor Herbert goes as far to say that "police have the implicit
authorization to create and apply an inferior set of rights to individuals in high-crime
areas." Id.
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contemporary stop and frisk practices than whites do. 254 This sentiment has
been echoed by Professor Maclin who wrote that "[b]lack men are associated
with 'crimes against the person, with bodily harm to police officers, and with
a general lack of support for the police' ..... For this reason, black males
doubly draw the attention of police officers. 255 Personal anecdotes from
African American men reveal that they expect to endure harassment and
unfair treatment at the hands of the police in the form of being stopped,
searched and interrogated under no valid justification.256 Whether or not the
harassment actually happens, the perception that it will or does take place is
just as potent encouragement for following the Stop Snitching code. Through
the gaps in the law, police have found a way to heavily investigate
"suspicious people," stopping them and frisking them in this vague and
enigmatic "high crime area." Although a "high crime area" cannot be the sole
basis for reasonable suspicion, police can cite many other factors, such as
fleeing or the time of day, in conjunction with the "high crime area," in order
to conduct a Terry-level search.257 Through this facade, police can now target
the people whom they wish to stop, a reality which causes a devastating toll
on the public's trust-especially when one is the victim of such an arbitrary
seizure. It is due to this mistreatment that many people feel antagonized by
law enforcement: "This combination of fear and distrust produce in many
blacks a hidden, but seething anger and contempt for the police. 258
IV. CLOSING THE GAP AND REBUILDING THE TRUST
What is imperative about the Fourth Amendment is that although police
officers may be the face of the law, their actions are defined in scope and
type by the Supreme Court. The allowance and use of deception is not
necessarily the product of police indiscretion, per se, but rather the result of
the Supreme Court's opinions. Trust within the law needs to be rebuilt by
254 Harris, Frisking Every Suspect, supra note 204, at 43-44.
255 Maclin, Black and Blue, supra note 109, at 259 (internal citations omitted).
256 Rosenfeld, supra note 102, at 295. One of the author's interviewees related this
anecdote: "We was standing on the corner, police pulled up, told us all to get against the
wall. We asked them, you know, what did we do, what we gotta get against the wall for?
'That ain't none of your motherfucking business! Just turn your ass around and get
against the wall.' [T]hey searched us and handcuffed us and, made us sit out there in the
rain for about 25 minutes." (ellipsis omitted).
257 See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 955 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (frisk
of individual in a high crime area late at night who flees from police is justified);
Commw. v. Sykes, 867 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Mass. 2007) (frisk of individual who moved
away from police by bicycle, and then on foot in a high crime area was supported by
reasonable suspicion).
258 Maclin, Black and Blue, supra note 109, at 258.
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fixing these gaps and closing the loopholes in the law that allow for such
deception.
A. Police Are Not the Sole Culprits
Though the logical fallacies may be palatable in Supreme Court
chambers, they have severe consequences when innocent people are, at least
perceptually, the victims of such practices on a consistent basis. This Note is
by no means asserting that police officers are inherently corrupt or unethical
individuals. Indeed, police have a strong and legitimate interest in protecting
their safety as they deal with the potentially volatile situations of traffic
stops, searches, and arrests.259 But because police officers function as the
primary interface between the Fourth Amendment and the public, it is often
the police who are blamed for the application of the law and bear the brunt of
the public's resentment.260 As Professor Maclin observes, "black males learn
at an early age that confrontation with the police should be avoided., 261 In
Baltimore, "[n]early 80% of officers said the relationship between police and
citizens was not very good. Nearly 50% of black officers believed that police
stop people based on race, gender, and age rather than probable cause. 262
Even though the police seem to bear the brunt of the public's resentment,
the true catalyst to the Stop Snitching movement is not police conduct alone.
259 It is no doubt that traffic stops "can sometimes be fraught with peril for the
police officer or state trooper-because they never know when a seemingly routine traffic
stop could lead to trouble, or even violence." Kevin Ransom, Inside the Mind of Cop Who
Stopped You, CNN.cOM Feb. 6, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/
wayoflife/02/06/cops.stop.cause/index.html. The safety of an officer serves as a
paramount policy justification for many of the search warrant exceptions carved out of
the Fourth Amendment. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (Fourth
Amendment does not require delay when doing so would endanger police safety in
exigent circumstances; therefore, police had right to warrantless search for weapon inside
home); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (under valid custodial arrest, police may search
immediate grabbing area of arrestee for weapons without warrant or probable cause);
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (not unreasonable to conduct a non-invasive search for weapons
under reasonable suspicion alone); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (quick
and limited protective sweep of premises for dangerous accomplices in places where
attack could be launched is reasonable, and incident to arrest). The problem arises when
warrantless searches extend beyond the exigency.
260 TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 198. The authors note that "police officers
are the legal authority with whom people most frequently interact in their everyday
lives," and therefore, "[a]lthough the courts [] exercise authority of the public, the police
are especially likely to control people through the threat or application of force and are a
natural focus of public hostility and resistance." Id.
261 Maclin, Black and Blue, supra note 109, at 255.
262 Ditkoff, supra note 51.
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Rather, police officers simply invoke the authority given to them by the
Supreme Court. Therefore, the legitimacy of deception (and its eventual
implementation) ultimately traces back to the Supreme Court Justices. As
Professor Harris wrote, "it is obvious that community policing ... depends
on mutual [trust]. As difficult as it will be to build, given the many years of
disrespect blacks have suffered at the hands of the police, the community
must feel that it can trust the police to treat them as law-abiding
citizens...,163 Only until the gaps within the law are closed can the public
once against begin to trust the police.
B. The Pre- Textual Stop (Redux)
There is no easy solution in closing the gaps within pre-textual vehicle
searches. However, on a theoretical level, the Court should, at a minimum,
cease to create bright line rules which produce the wrong result in the case at
hand.264 To be certain, police must have the authority to investigate if
necessary, but at the same time, they should not have unlimited power to
conduct an open expedition without some sort of basis for doing so.2 65 This
in turn creates a duty upon the Court to "impose sensible restrictions on when
officers may pull over a car, what they may require occupants to do once the
car is pulled over, and when and how the detention must terminate.' 266
Professor Maclin argues that without these restrictions, arbitrary questioning
runs the risk of violating Terry's command that an investigative intrusion be
"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which render its initiation
permissible.,2 67
263 Harris, supra note 18, at 309. In the context of "driving while back," Professor
Harris argues that there is no reason for African Americans to trust the police when every
time they drive, they are targeted as criminals. Id. Indeed, police departments themselves
should have a strong desire to stop such racially motivated tactics, such as the "driving
while black" phenomenon; however, the real problem lies in the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence which grants police officers the legal means to carry it out.
264 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47. The Court flatly stated: "If we were to derive a
rule exclusively to address the contested facts, Atwater might well prevail." Id. at 346.
This point is also expressed, somewhat sarcastically, by Professor Logan: "[R]ather than
erring in favor of allowing police to be 'jerks,' the Court should have deferred to
reasonableness considerations militating in favor of protecting the physical and privacy
interests of citizens." Logan, supra note 136, at 456. However, Justice Kennedy was the
first to say in oral argument, "It's not a constitutional violation for a police officer to be a
jerk." Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Atwater, 532 U.S. 315.
265 Maclin, Traffic Stops, supra note 192, at 38.
266 Sklansky, supra note 119, at 325-26.




The Supreme Court has recently taken an optimistic step toward re-
instilling trust in the law by rejecting the legal fiction from Belton that a
vehicle's passenger compartment is always within a suspect's grabbing
area.268 In a sharp departure from Belton, the Court weighed in favor of the
privacy interests of the individual rather than in favor of the utility of a bright
line rule and held in Arizona v. Gant that "the Chimel rationale authorizes
police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the
arestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search., 26 9 As demonstrated by this ruling, the
Court has recognized the irrationality of justifying Belton's bright line rule
on the assumption that evidence needs to be protected from a suspect who
cannot physically reach it.
However positive the decision in Arizona v. Gant may be, it alone is not
a sufficient solution to the mistrust felt by minorities toward police. In certain
circumstances, suspicion to stop a vehicle is often based upon the race of the
driver. Due to the Whren-Atwater-Belton line of cases, race can be the
triggering factor for a valid stop, arrest, and search.270 To close the loophole
created by this succession of holdings, it may be necessary to start at the very
beginning: the pre-textual stop based on race. The Supreme Court has failed
to realize just how humiliating, frightening, and dangerous it can be for
African Americans when they are arbitrarily stopped by the police.271 Not
268 Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2009). Additionally, the Court
refused to "[rely] on stare decisis to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional poilce
practice." Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542, slip op. at 10-11 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2009).
269 Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2009). In fact, the
Court stated that "it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment" to allow any vehicle search
based on an arrest if the only purpose is a police entitlement. Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542
slip op. at 14 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2009).
270 See infra Part III.C.2.
271 Sklansky, supra note 119, at 272. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
provided a glimpse into the discrepancy in treatment that even famous African Americans
must endure:
The police have also erroneously stopped businessman and former Los Angeles
Laker star Jamaal Wilkes in his car and handcuffed him, and stopped 1984 Olympic
medalist Al Joyner twice in the space of twenty minutes, and once forcing him out of
his car, handcuffing him, and making him to lie spread-eagled on the ground at
gunpoint... Similarly, actor Wesley Snipes was taken from his car at gunpoint,
handcuffed, and forced to lie on the ground while a policeman kneeled on his neck
and held a gun to his head.
Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1182 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis original).
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only can an unreasonable arrest for a traffic violation be embarrassing,2 but
such arrest can be perilous to the African American, given that the police
seem to be quick to draw their weapons.273 Some scholars have forcefully
argued that the Court's refusal to take race into consideration was a "wrong
turn," since "social science data [reflects that] the Court has underestimated
the extent to which racial factors affect an individual officer's perceptions,
memory, and reporting, transforming what may be innocent behavior into
indicia of criminality and the basis for a search or seizure., 274 This Note is
not arguing for an automatic, heightened scrutiny standard; it is merely
asserting that the Supreme Court should not have pushed all considerations
of race out of the Fourth Amendment analysis.275 Although the Court in
Whren obviously admonished blatant racism, it deferred attacks on the racial
motivations of a vehicle stop to the Equal Protection Clause: "Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis. 276 Of course, such claims based on racism do properly fit within
the Equal Protection Clause; however, this should not necessarily preclude
the Court from taking race into consideration under the Fourth
Amendment-especially when race does serve as a strong motivating factor
in so many seizures and searches.277
272 See Harris, supra note 18, at 270-71. When an African American social worker
in her early thirties was arrested on her way to work, she burst into tears as she was
handcuffed on a public street, put in the back of a patrol car, and watched as her vehicle
was searched. Id. Even as time passed, she still felt the pain, fear, and humiliation of the
incident, "I didn't want anyone to know," she said, "I was so embarrassed." Id.
273 See Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1183 n. 1.
274 Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 1012 (1999).
275 See Sklansky, supra note 119, at 328.
276 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. The Equal Protection Clause contained within the
Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
277 Thompson, supra note 274, at 961 (arguing that "it is too soon to take the Fourth
Amendment off the table as a source of relief for racially motivated searches and
seizures."). The text of the Fourth Amendment does not provide a remedy for a
constitutional violation; therefore the Supreme Court has devised its own remedy via the
"exclusionary rule." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (applying the exclusionary
rule to the states). This doctrine provides that when an item has been illegally seized
through an unreasonable search, it cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief
against the victim of the search. Id. at 655. There are three important aspects of this
doctrine. First, it is an incredibly narrow rule and subject to many exceptions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (exclusionary rule will not suppress
evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant if the police relied on the warrant in
objectively reasonable good faith). Second, the Supreme Court has eroded this doctrine
into a 'judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
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C. Seizure of People (Redefined)
The anomaly between a legal seizure and a layman's conception of
seizure is inconsistent, and even divergent, when they should be
synonymous.278 The Supreme Court must take into consideration that a
reasonable person often does not feel free to leave the presence of a police
officer. The Court's underestimation of how intimidated an individual feels
near police is apparent in its opinions and in the way the Court distributes the
burden between police and the public.279 Instead of placing the burden on the
individual to remove himself from the encounter by walking away, the Court
should place the burden on police officers by limiting their authority to
interrogate citizens, unless there is a particularized and objective justification
for doing so.28° If the police lack this basis for seizing a person, the citizen
should be able to decide whether they would like to deal with the police, if at
all, without it being used against them.2 8  This is the gap in the law that the
Supreme Court should close: "When the officer lacks any individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing, surely a citizen's refusal to comply with the
officer's command is no justification for escalating the intrusiveness of the
encounter. ' '282 Although the Supreme Court has given citizens the
opportunity to walk away from a police officer,283 to depart a bus during a
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (emphasis added).
Since it is judicially created, it can be judicially taken away: the Court has recently
rendered the exclusionary rule nearly null by hinting that it does not apply when police
fail to "knock and announce" while executing a search warrant. Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586, 594 (2006). But the most important aspect of the exclusionary rule for this
Note's purposes is that it fails to provide an adequate remedy for the innocent. The
doctrine itself is triggered only when there is evidence to be suppressed in a subsequent
prosecution. It will only affect those individuals who actually had evidence illegally
seized from them. The rule does not affect a person who has been illegally searched and
seized, yet had no evidence taken away.
278 Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 199, at 1301.
279 Id. at 1303.
280 Id.
281 Id.; See also Herbert, supra note 246, at 159 ("The Wardlow decision effectively
encourages police to create and skew the information gathered from their experience to
convince courts that reactive flight is always indicative of criminality.").
282 Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 199, at 1295-96.
283 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544.
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2841sweep,284 and to move about a factory during a raid,285 the consequences of
refusing a police officer's request are usually more troubling to the citizen.286
In Fourth Amendment issues, the Court is constantly balancing
individual liberties and the legitimate interest of furthering police
investigations and protecting police safety.287 Yet in decisions such as Terry
and Mendenhall, the balance is clearly in favor of the police, thereby
exposing innocent citizens to the deceptive tactics allowed under the Fourth
Amendment. This deception usually falls heavily on the shoulders of African
Americans since it still appears that race is a significant factor in how police
choose who to stop for investigatory searches and seizures.28 Professor
Maclin strongly advocates that because the dynamics between a black male
and a police officer are so unique, race should be a viable factor in defining
"the reasonable man" under Terry-Mendenhall.2 9 In many ways, the
hypothetical reasonable and average person is not representative of an
African American inner-city man. In at least recognizing that black men are
more disadvantaged when it comes to Fourth Amendment application, the
Supreme Court could begin to grant them what the Constitution promises:
fair treatment under the law.290 Professor Maclin's argument was ground-
breaking in the early 1990s, and, a decade later, it would be a viable option in
remedying the distrust which has fueled the Stop Snitching movement.
It is tempting to advocate safety on the streets in exchange for the
sacrifice of the individual liberties of some (namely African Americans and
Hispanic Americans); however, this cannot be the foundation of a feasible
solution to combating crime. Some advocate more aggressive "gun
284 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194.
285 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210.
286 See Maclin, Black and Blue, supra note 109, at 258. "The black male who is
stopped is left with little choice but to remain calm and silent. Challenging the police or
becoming belligerent is not an advisable course of conduct, although some individuals do
choose this option." Id. Although there may be exceptions, Professor Maclin notes that
most individuals stopped by the police do not offer resistance for this reason.
287 Maclin, Locomotion, supra note 199, at 1302; see also Tracey Maclin, The
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 247 (1993)
("The Court's rational basis model essentially asks whether the police have acted
irrationally while intruding upon the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals. The
Court's model rarely requires warrants... and prefers deference to police procedures as
the mode of constitutional decisionmaking.").
288 Maclin, Black and Blue, supra note 109, at 268. This is, of course, denied by
many law enforcement officers; yet even if such racist motives are not at play-the mere
perception that they are is just as detrimental.
289 Id. at 250.
290 Id. at 272.
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frisking. ' '291 However, the implementation of plans such as these is what
inspires the Stop Snitching movement. Allowing innocent African Americans
to constantly be the target of additional searches, seizures, and suspicions
will only harbor more distrust. Even if targeting African Americans through
the loopholes in the law did reduce the crime rate, this justification alone
should not be used to sacrifice the constitutional liberties of an entire cohort
of citizens. A reduction in crime would be a benefit, but a short-term one at
best because the long-term ramifications of distrust (such as the Stop
Snitching movement) are far more detrimental to the justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
It is hard to stop a movement that has already swelled far beyond its
tipping point.292 In Gladwell's terms, the Stop Snitching movement has
proven to be both "contagious" in its transmission, and "sticky" in its
pervasiveness.293 There are two choices in countering the movement: policy-
makers could hinder the dissemination of the message, or they could
undermine the public's desire to follow the code. The most viable and
potentially successful option is the latter. Although it would be desirable to
somehow prevent the Stop Snitching message from further transmission, the
current laws in this country are ill-equipped to do so. The First Amendment
cannot restrain the artistic medium by which the message spreads-no matter
how infuriating the outcome may be to prosecutors and police. Moreover,
current state obstruction of justice laws cannot punish inaction. Yet even if
they did, this would not be the best way to stop the movement.
Instead, the focus needs to be on making the epidemic less "sticky" 294 -
in other words, finding a way to make the Stop Snitching code less attractive
to follow. The answer is to repair the distrust which has been building
between African Americans and law enforcement for decades. Trust is
paramount in any relationship, and this notion is no different when applied to
the intricate interplay between the public and the police.295 However, the
police are not the primary source of the distrust-that path leads to the
chambers of the Supreme Court of the United States. In a series of decisions,
291 Wilson, supra note 204 and accompanying notes. Wilson expressly notes that
stopping and frisking young black and Hispanic men at a higher rate is worth the
potential benefits of reducing the number of firearms on the streets. Wilson, supra note
204.
292 See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 233.
293 See id. Gladwell discusses what he calls the "sticky factor" of teenage smoking,
and how difficult it has been for policy-makers to counter the epidemic. Id.
294 Id. at 250.
295 TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 17, at 175.
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the Supreme Court has created a body of Fourth Amendment law that both
blatantly and covertly allows for deception. The Court has blatantly allowed
the use of deception to stop and search a vehicle, even when there is no
probable cause. It has also covertly permitted deception within the realm of
seizure of people by creating a test which is not congruent with how
"reasonable people" truly feel and by providing police a means to target
certain "high crime people". The perceived unfairness, illogicality, and
unreasonableness of the Supreme Court serves as a catalyst for the anger that
the public feels when they are subjected to the Court's holdings in stops and
searches that happen every day in every city. When such a broad amendment
touches so many lives, it is the Supreme Court's duty, not only to maintain a
veneer of trustworthiness, but to embody it. Instilling trust within the law is
the first step to countering the Stop Snitching movement-it is the critical
step in ending this epidemic.
